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Abstract
In presence of incomplete information about the world we need to distinguish between the state
of the world and the state of the agent’s knowledge about the world. In such a case the agent may
need to have at its disposal sensing actions that change its state of knowledge about the world and
may need to construct more general plans consisting of sensing actions and conditional statements
to achieve its goal. In this paper we first develop a high-level action description language that allows
specification of sensing actions and their effects in its domain description and allows queries with
conditional plans. We give provably correct translations of domain description in our language to
axioms in first-order logic, and relate our formulation to several earlier formulations in the literature.
We then analyze the state space of our formulation and develop several sound approximations that
have much smaller state spaces. Finally we define regression of knowledge formulas over conditional
plans. Ó 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Sensing actions; Action description languages; Conditional plans; Regression of knowledge
formulas; Incomplete information; Approximate reasoning
1. Introduction and motivation
Unlike actions that change the world, sensing or knowledge producing actions change
what the agent knows about the world. Consider the following example of a high security
door. The action of pushing the door (push_door)—when executed in a world where the
(lock of the) door is initially unlocked and not jammed—will change the world so that
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after the action is performed the door is open. The same action if executed when the door
is locked will jam the door. Similarly, the action of flipping the lock (flip_lock) will unlock
a locked door and lock an unlocked door. On the other hand the sensing action of checking
the lock of the door (check_if _locked) will result in the agent knowing if the door is locked
or not.
Sensing actions play an important role when an agent needs to plan in presence of
incomplete information. Consider the case when our agent initially (i.e., in the initial
situation) does not know if the door is locked or not, but knows that the door is not jammed
and is not open and its goal is to open the door. We will assume that the only actions it
can perform are the ones described earlier: check_if _locked, flip_lock and push_door. We
now argue that the agent cannot just construct a classical plan—consisting of a sequence
of actions—that will always (i.e., regardless of what the real state of the world is) succeed
in reaching the agent’s goal.
Let us first consider the plan P1 consisting of push_door. This plan will not work
if the door is initially locked. In fact it will jam the door, and no subsequent action
sequence will result in the door being open. Let us now consider the plan P2 consisting
of flip_lock;push_door. This plan will not work if the door is initially unlocked. In fact
it will also jam the door, and no subsequent action sequence will result in the door being
open. Therefore, neither P1, nor P2, and nor any plan that starts with P1 and P2 will work
in both cases. This, together with the fact that the action check_if _locked does not change
the world and a sequence of flip_locks is equivalent to zero or a single flip_lock, is enough
to conclude that there does not exist a classical plan that will work for all possible initial
situations.
The following simple conditional plan P3,
IF ¬door_locked THEN push_door ELSE flip_lock;push_door
is not appropriate either. That is because the agent not knowing whether door_locked is true
or not cannot execute this plan. A correct conditional plan, P4, that will always achieve the
goal uses the sensing action check_if _locked, and is as follows:
check_if _locked;
IF ¬door_locked THEN push_door ELSE flip_lock;push_door.
Thus sensing actions are very important for planning in presence of incomplete informa-
tion. In the past, sensing actions have been formalized in [24,38,40,41,49] and planning
in presence of incomplete information has been studied in [11,15,16,18,23,28,31,44,46,
50,54]. To motivate our work we now briefly review the earlier formalizations of sensing
actions.
1.1. Moore’s formalization
To the best of our knowledge sensing actions were first formalized by Moore in his
dissertation [40] and in some of his later papers; for example, [41]. Moore uses possible
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world semantics to represent knowledge and treats the accessibility relation between
worlds as a fluent when reasoning about sensing and non-sensing actions.
• He describes how the knowledge of an agent may change after executing a non-
sensing action a, by defining the accessibility relation between the worlds that may
be reached after executing the action a.
According to him, for any two possible worlds w1 and w2 such that w2 is the result
of the execution of a in w1, the worlds that are compatible with what the agent knows
in w2 are exactly the worlds that are the result of executing a in some world that is
compatible with what the agent knows in w1. This can be formally written as follows:
∀w1,w2.(w2 = do(a,w1)⊃
∀w3.(acc(w2,w3)≡
∃w4.acc(w1,w4)∧w3 = do(a,w4))). (1.1)
The above formula (and the next formula) is a simplified version of Moore’s original
formula. Here we use the function do from situation calculus, 1 use acc(w,w′) to
denote that w′ is accessible from (or is compatible with) w, and assume a single agent
world.
• He also describes how the knowledge of an agent may change after executing a
sensing action sensef , by defining accessibility relation between the worlds that may
be reached after executing sensef .
Suppose sensef is an action that the agent can perform to know if f is true or not.
Then for any world represented by w1 and w2 such that w2 is the result of sensef
happening in w1, the world that is compatible with what the agent knows in w2 are
exactly those worlds that are the result of sensef happening in some world that is
compatible with what the agent knows in w1, and in which f has the same truth value
as in w2. This can be formally written as follows:
∀w1,w2.(w2 = do(sensef ,w1)⊃
∀w3.((acc(w2,w3)≡
∃w4.acc(w1,w4)∧
w3 = do(sensef ,w4)∧ f (w2)≡ f (w3))). (1.2)
1.2. Scherl and Levesque’s formalization
Scherl and Levesque [49] adapted Moore’s formulation to situation calculus and proved
several important results about their formulation such as: knowledge-producing actions
do not affect fluents other than the knowledge fluent; and that actions that are not
knowledge-producing only affect the knowledge fluent as appropriate. They also showed
how regression can be applied to knowledge-producing actions.
Their slight simplification of Moore’s formulation is given by the following two
formulas: (Note that in their use of the relation K , which we will follow in the rest of the
1 do(a,w) denotes the world reached after executing the action a in the world w.
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paper, the arguments are reversed from their normal modal logic use. I.e., K(s′, s) is read
as “the situation s′ is accessible from the situation s”. Also, situation is a term constructed
by repeated application of do to the initial situation S0.)
K(s′′,do(a, s))≡ (∃s′.K(s′, s)∧ s′′ = do(a, s′)), (1.3)
K(s′′,do(sensef , s))≡ (∃s′.K(s′, s)∧ s′′ = do(sensef , s′)∧ f (s′)≡ f (s)). (1.4)
1.3. Our simplification
One of our goals in this paper is to make it easy to visualize the state space we have
to deal with when searching for plans in presence of sensing actions and incomplete
information. Many formulations of planning (for example, most research on decision
theoretic planning) often assume the existence of a transition function defining a transition
between states—a collection of fluents—due to actions, and do not necessarily depend on
a logical formulation defining this function. The questions that we would like to answer
are: What is a “state” when we need to distinguish between the state of the world and the
state of the knowledge of an agent? How are state transitions due to actions—both sensing
and non-sensing—defined?
To answer the first question we introduce the notion of a c-state (or combined state)
which is a pair consisting of:
(i) the real state of the world, s; and
(ii) the state of the agent’s knowledge about the world given by the set of states Σ , that
the agent thinks it may be in.
The transition between c-states due to actions—denoted by Φ(a, 〈s,Σ〉)—can then be
defined in terms of the original transition between states (defined using the function Res)
in the following way:
• If a is a non-sensing action then for any c-state σ = 〈s,Σ〉, Φ(a,σ ) is defined as the
pair 〈Res(a, s), {s′ | s′ = Res(a, s′′) for some s′′ ∈Σ}〉.
• If sensef is a sensing action that senses the fluent f then for any c-state σ = 〈s,Σ〉,
Φ(sensef , σ ) is defined as the pair 〈s, {s′ | s′ ∈Σ such that f ∈ s iff f ∈ s′}〉.
Consider our example in the beginning of this section. The two possible initial c-states—
with explicit representation of negative fluents—for this example are:
σ1 = 〈{locked}, {{locked},∅}〉 and σ2 = 〈∅, {{locked},∅}〉.
In Fig. 1 we give a fragment of the state space diagram of this example illustrating how
transitions take place between one c-state to another because of actions.
For a logical formalization of the above we simplify Moore’s and Scherl and Levesque’s
formulation by assuming that we only need to proceed from theK relation about the initial
situation to possible future situations. The formulas (1.3) and (1.4) can then be modified as
follows:
K(do(a, s′),do(a, s))≡K(s′, s), (1.5)
K(do(sensef , s′),do(sensef , s))≡ (K(s′, s)∧ f (s′)≡ f (s)). (1.6)
T.C. Son, C. Baral / Artificial Intelligence 125 (2001) 19–91 23
Fig. 1. Transition between c-states in the door opening example.
Using the above two formulas, successor state axioms about actions [47], and information
about the initial situation, we can then reason about what is known to be true in a future
situation. We discuss this formulation in further detail in Section 2.3.
1.4. Our goals
Our first goal in this paper is to augment the high-level language A [20,21] to allow
specifications and reasoning about sensing actions. We will call the new language AK .
The semantics of domain descriptions in AK will be defined using the transition functions
introduced in the previous subsection. The motivation behind doing this is the simplicity
of high-level languages and the fact that no knowledge about particular logics is necessary
to understand the concept. But we pay the price of being less general than when the
formalization is done in a standard logical language (classical logic possibly augmented
with circumscription, logic programming, default logic, etc.). But then later we give
formalizations in logic, and prove the correctness of our logical formalization with respect
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to our original formalization. Thus our initial formalization using a high-level language—
which is simpler to follow—can play the role of a benchmark for formalizations in standard
logical languages.
Our second goal, and perhaps the most important aspect of this paper, is to develop
approximations of the languageAK . The motivation behind that is the possible state space
explosion in AK . In presence of n fluents, we will have 2n possible states and 22n+n
possible c-states. We develop several approximations with much smaller state space (3n)
but with varying complexity in computing transitions. We then show the soundness of these
approximations.
Finally, we relate our formulations with earlier formulations of sensing actions—in
particular with Scherl and Levesque’s [49] formulation and Lobo et al.’s [38] formulation—
and show that:
(i) when we translate domain descriptions in our language to Scherl and Levesque’s
formulation we obtain similar conclusions, and
(ii) when we make certain assumptions about our knowledge about the initial state
then domain descriptions in our language have the same semantics as that of the
semantics defined by Lobo et al. [38].
We also discuss some of the earlier work on planning with sensing actions [15,16,22,23],
compare the formulations there with that of ours, and briefly describe earlier work on
regression and adapt a simplified version of regression from [49] to define regression with
respect to conditional plans.
2. The languageAK
In this section we introduceAK—an extension of the languageA in [21]—which allows
reasoning about sensing actions. (Strictly speaking, AK is a variation of A instead of an
extension, as unlike in A, we do not allow observations or hypothesis about non-initial
situations in our domain descriptions. Moreover, our language has two components [4,34]:
one which defines domain descriptions and another which defines queries.)
2.1. Syntax of AK
We begin with two disjoint nonempty sets of symbols, called fluent names (or fluents)
and action names (or actions). A fluent literal is either a fluent name or a fluent name
preceded by ¬. For a fluent f , by ¬f we mean f , and by f we mean ¬f .
2.1.1. Domain descriptions in AK
A v-proposition (value proposition) is an expression of the form
initiallyf (2.1)
where f is a fluent literal. Intuitively, the above v-proposition means that the fluent literal
f is initially known to be true. (In A, where v-propositions describe the initial state of
the world instead of what the agent knows about the initial state of the world, the above
proposition has a slightly different meaning. There, the above proposition means that the
fluent literal f is true in the initial state of the world.)
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Two v-propositions initiallyf and initiallyg are said to be contradictory if f = g.
An ef-proposition (effect proposition) is an expression of the form
a causesf if p1, . . . , pn (2.2)
where a is an action, and each of f,p1, . . . , pn (n> 0) is a fluent literal. The set of fluent
literals {p1, . . . , pn} is referred to as the precondition of the ef-proposition and f is referred
to as the effect of this ef-proposition. Intuitively this proposition conveys the meaning that
f is guaranteed to be true after the execution of an action a in any state of the world where
p1, . . . , pn are true. If n= 0, we will drop the if part and simply write a causesf .
Two ef-propositions with preconditions p1, . . . , pn and q1, . . . , qm respectively are said
to be contradictory if they describe the effect of the same action a on complementary f ’s,
and {p1, . . . , pn} ∩ {q1, . . . , qm} = ∅.
An ex-proposition (executability proposition) is an expression of the form
executable a if p1, . . . , pn (2.3)
where a is an action, and each of p1, . . . , pn (n > 0) is a fluent literal. Intuitively, this
proposition conveys the meaning that the action a is executable in any state of the world
where p1, . . . , pn are true. If n= 0, we will drop the if part and simply write executable a.
A k-proposition (knowledge proposition) is an expression of the form
a determines p (2.4)
where a is an action and p is a fluent. Intuitively, the above proposition conveys the
meaning that if a is executed in a situation, then in the resulting situation the truth value
of p becomes known.
A proposition is a v-proposition, ef-proposition, ex-proposition or a k-proposition.
A domain description is a set of propositions, which does not contain
(i) contradictory v-propositions; or
(ii) contradictory ef-propositions.
Actions occurring in ef-propositions and k-propositions are called non-sensing actions and
sensing actions, respectively. In this paper—to avoid distraction from the main points—
we make the further assumption that the set of sensing actions and the set of non-sensing
actions are disjoint. Following is an example of a domain description in our language.
Example 1. Let us consider an agent who has to disarm a bomb which can only be
done safely—i.e., without exploding—if a special lock on the bomb has been switched
off (locked); otherwise it explodes. The agent can determine if the lock is locked or not by
looking at the lock. He can also turn the lock from the locked position to the unlocked
position and vice versa. He can only execute the above actions if the bomb has not
exploded. Initially, the agent knows that the bomb is not disarmed and is not exploded.
We can describe the above story by the following domain description.
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initially ¬disarmed
initially ¬exploded
disarm causes exploded if ¬locked
disarm causes disarmed if locked
turn causes ¬locked if locked
turn causes locked if ¬locked
look determines locked
executable look if ¬exploded
executable turn if ¬exploded
executable disarm if ¬exploded

=D1
2.1.2. Queries in AK
As discussed in Section 1, in the presence of incomplete information and knowledge
producing actions, we need to extend the notion of a plan from a sequence of actions so
as to allow conditional statements. In the following definition we formalize the notion of a
conditional plan.
Definition 1 (Conditional plan).
(1) An empty sequence of action, denoted by [ ], is a conditional plan.
(2) If a is an action then a is a conditional plan.
(3) If c1, . . . , cn (n> 1) are conditional plans and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn are conjunction of fluent
literals, (which are mutually exclusive but not necessarily exhaustive) then the
following is a conditional plan. (We refer to such a plan as a case plan).
Case
ϕ1→ c1
. . .
ϕn→ cn
Endcase
(4) If c1, c2 are conditional plans then c1; c2 is a conditional plan.
(5) Nothing else is a conditional plan.
Intuitively, the case plan is a case statement where the agent evaluates the various
ϕi’s with respect to its knowledge. If it knows that ϕi is true for some i it executes the
corresponding ci . If none of the ϕi ’s are true then the case plan fails and the execution of
the conditional plan which contains this case plan also fails.
There are two kind of queries that we can ask our domain descriptions. They are of the
form:
Knows ϕ after c (2.5)
Kwhether ϕ after c (2.6)
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where c is a conditional plan and ϕ is a fluent formula. Intuitively, the first query is about
asking if a domain description entails that the fluent formula ϕ will be known to be true
after executing the conditional plan c in the initial situation, and the second query is about
asking if a domain description entails that the fluent formula ϕ will be known to be true or
known to be false after executing the conditional plan c in the initial situation.
2.2. Semantics of AK
In AK , we have three kinds of states: a world state (often referred to as a state)
representing the state of the world, a knowledge state (or a k-state), representing the state
of the knowledge of the agent, and a combined state (or a c-state) that is a pair consisting
of a world state, and a k-state. As mentioned earlier, the semantics of domain descriptions
in AK are defined in terms of models which are pairs consisting of an initial c-state and a
transition function that maps pairs of actions and c-states into c-states.
In the following we will use small letters beginning from s (possibly with indexes) to
denote world states, uppercase Greek letters like Σ (possibly with indexes) to denote k-
states, and lowercase Greek letters like σ, δ (possibly with indexes) to denote c-states. The
letter c (possibly with indexes) will be used exclusively to denote conditional plans while
α (possibly with indexes) will be used to denote a sequence of actions.
A state s is a set of fluents and a k-state is a set of states. A combined state (or c-state)
of an agent is a pair 〈s,Σ〉 where s is a state and Σ is a k-state. Intuitively, the state s in a
c-state 〈s,Σ〉 is the real state of the world whereasΣ is the set of possible states which an
agent believes it might be in. We say a c-state σ = 〈s,Σ〉 is grounded if s ∈Σ . Intuitively,
grounded c-states correspond to the assumption that the world state belongs to the set of
states that the agent believes it may be in.
Given a fluent f and a state s, we say that f holds in s (f is true in s) if f ∈ s; ¬f
holds in s (f is false in s) if f /∈ s. The truth of a propositional fluent formula with respect
to s is defined as usual. We say two states s and s′ agree on a fluent f if (f ∈ s iff f ∈ s′).
Given a c-state σ = 〈s,Σ〉, we say that a fluent f is known to be true (respectively known
to be false) in 〈s,Σ〉 if f is true (respectively false) in every state s′ ∈Σ ; and f is known
in 〈s,Σ〉, if f is known to be true or known to be false in 〈s,Σ〉. Given a fluent formula
ϕ, we say that ϕ is known to be true (respectively false) in a c-state 〈s,Σ〉 if ϕ is true
(respectively false) in every state s′ ∈Σ .
An action a is executable in a state s, if there exists an ex-proposition executable a if p1,
. . . , pn in D such that p1, . . . , pn hold in s.
For an action a and a state s, if a is executable in s, we define
E+a (s)= {f | f is a fluent and there exists an ef-proposition
“a causesf if p1, . . . , pn” ∈D such that p1, . . . , pn hold in s},
E−a (s)= {f | f is a fluent and there exists an ef-proposition
“a causes ¬f if p1, . . . , pn” ∈D such that p1, . . . , pn hold in s},
and
Res(a, s)= s ∪E+a (s) \E−a (s).
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If a is not executable in s, we say that Res(a, s) is undefined.
Intuitively, Res(a, s) is the state resulting from executing a in s. Since we do not allow
contradictory ef-propositions in our domain description, for any pair of an action a and a
state s, E+a (s) andE−a (s) are disjoint and uniquely determined. Thus Res is a deterministic
function.
We are now ready to define Φ , the transition function between c-states.
Definition 2. A function Φ from actions and c-states into c-states is called a transition
function of D if for all c-state σ = 〈s,Σ〉 and action a,
(1) if a is not executable in s then Φ(a,σ ) is undefined, denoted by Φ(a,σ )=⊥;
(2) if a is executable in s and a is a non-sensing action, then
Φ(a,σ )= 〈Res(a, s), {s′ | s′ = Res(a, s′′) for some s′′ ∈Σ such that
a is executable in s′′}〉;
and
(3) if a is executable in s and a is a sensing action whose k-propositions are
a determines f1, . . . , a determines fm, then
Φ(a,σ )= 〈s, {s′ | s′ ∈Σ such that s and s′agree on eachfi, (i 6m), and
a is executable in s′}〉.
Since Res is a deterministic function, it is easy to show the following:
Proposition 1. Every domain description D possesses a unique transition function Φ .
Notice that our definition of the transition function Φ does not stipulate any special
requirement on how the Res function is defined. Thus, any action description language [3,
26,53] with a semantics depending on a state transition function like Res can be extended
to allow sensing actions. Therefore, several of the other features of action description
languages such as multi-valued fluents [19], ramification [26,36], causality [1,35,43],
concurrent actions [2,3,37], can be directly added to our framework. For example, to extend
our formulation to multi-valued fluents, we have to:
(i) extend our propositions to be able to denote different values of the fluents, and
(ii) extend our notion of states to be interpretations of the fluents.
The definition of transition function will remain the same, except that the notion of s and s′
agreeing on a fluent f would now mean that s and s′ have the same value of f . To keep our
focus on the main issue of formalizing sensing actions, we do not include these features in
our formulation, as they can be directly added when desired.
Definition 3.
(1) A state s is called an initial state of a domain description D if for every value
proposition of the form “initially p” (respectively “initially ¬p”) in D, p is true
(respectively false) in s.
(2) A c-state 〈s0,Σ0〉 is an initial c-state of D if s0 is an initial state and Σ0 is a set of
initial states of D.
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We say an initial c-state σ0 = 〈s0,Σ0〉 is complete if Σ0 is the set of all initial states.
Intuitively, the completeness of initial c-states express the assumption that our agent has
complete knowledge about what it knows and does not know about the initial state. We
will refer to this as the complete awareness assumption. 2 Even though, we believe that
this assumption should not be used indiscriminately, since it reduces the number of initial
c-states, we will use it in most of our examples.
Definition 4. A model of a domain description D is a pair (σ0,Φ) such that σ0 is a
grounded initial c-state of D and Φ is a transition function of D. A model (σ0,Φ) is
called rational if σ0 is complete.
Since the transition functionΦ as defined so far can only tell us which c-state is reached
after executing an action in a given c-state, we need to extend the function to be able
to reason—beyond action sequences—about conditional plans. We call it the extended
function of Φ and define it as follows.
Definition 5. LetD be a domain description andΦ be its transition function. The extended
transition function ofD, denoted by Φ̂ , which maps pairs of conditional plans and c-states
into c-states, is defined as follows.
(1) Φ̂([], σ )= σ .
(2) For an action a, Φ̂(a, σ )=Φ(a,σ ).
(3) For
c= Case
ϕ1→ c1
. . .
ϕn→ cn
Endcase,
Φ̂(c, σ )=
{
Φ̂(ci , σ ) if ϕi is known to be true in σ ,
⊥ if none of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn is known to be true in σ .
(4) For c= c1; c2, where c1, c2 are conditional plans, Φ̂(c, σ )= Φ̂(c2, Φ̂(c1, σ )).
(5) Φ̂(c,⊥)=⊥ for every conditional plan c.
We say that a conditional plan c is executable in a c-state σ if Φ̂(c, σ ) 6=⊥. 3
We are now ready to define the entailment relation for domains of AK .
Definition 6. Let D be a domain description, c be a conditional plan, and ϕ be a fluent
formula. We say,
2 Turner [52] used a similar assumption called “complete initial situation assumption” according to which each
model of his logic programming formulation of actions would have complete information about the initial state.
3 It is easy to see that for every pair of a c-state σ and a conditional plan c, Φ̂(c, σ )=⊥ or there exists a unique
c-state σ ′ such that Φ̂(c, σ )= σ ′ .
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(i) D |=AK Knows ϕ after c if c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in
Φ̂(c, σ0) for every model (σ0,Φ) of D;
(ii) D |=AK Kwhether ϕ after α if c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true or
known to be false in Φ̂(α,σ0) for every model (σ0,Φ) of D.
Rational entailment of queries with respect to D—denoted by |=rAK—is defined similarly
by only considering rational models of D.
The following examples elucidates the above definitions.
Example 2. Let D2 be the domain description consisting of the following propositions.
initiallyf
a causes ¬f
senseg determines g
executable a
executable senseg

=D2
Let s1 = {f,g}, s2 = {f }, s3 = {g}, s4 = ∅.
There are two possible complete initial c-states of D2: σ1 = 〈s1, {s1, s2}〉 and σ2 =
〈s2, {s1, s2}〉. Let Φ be the transition function of D2. We then have:
Φ̂([a], σ1)=Φ(a,σ1)= 〈s3, {s3, s4}〉,
Φ̂([a; senseg], σ1)= Φ̂([senseg], 〈s3, {s3, s4}〉)= 〈s3, {s3}〉,
Φ̂([a], σ2)= 〈s4, {s3, s4}〉,
Φ̂([a; senseg], σ2)= Φ̂([senseg], 〈s4, {s3, s4}〉)= 〈s4, {s4}〉.
Since g is known to be true in 〈s3, {s3}〉 and known to be false in 〈s4, {s4}〉, we can conclude
that D2 |=rAK Kwhether g after [a, senseg].
However, D2 6|=rAK Kwhether g after [a], because g is not known to be true or known
to be false in 〈s3, {s3, s4}〉. Furthermore,
D2 6|=rAK Knows g after [a, senseg], and
D2 6|=rAK Knows ¬g after [a, senseg].
In the following example we consider conditional plans.
Example 3. Let us consider the domain descriptionD1 from Example 1. The states of D1
are:
s1 = ∅, s5 = {disarmed},
s2 = {locked}, s6 = {disarmed, exploded},
s3 = {exploded}, s7 = {disarmed, locked},
s4 = {locked, exploded}, s8 = {disarmed, locked, exploded}.
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The set of initial states of D1 is Σ0 = {s1, s2} and the two complete initial c-states of D1
are σ1 = 〈s1,Σ0〉 and σ2 = 〈s2,Σ0〉. Let Φ be the transition function of D1. Thus, by
Definition 4, D1 has two rational models: (σ1,Φ) and (σ2,Φ). We have:
Φ̂([look], σ1)= 〈s1, {s1}〉,
Φ̂([look;disarm], σ1)= 〈s3, {s3}〉,
Φ̂([look; turn], σ1)= 〈s2, {s2}〉,
Φ̂([look; turn;disarm], σ1)= 〈s7, {s7}〉,
Φ̂([look], σ2)= 〈s2, {s2}〉,
Φ̂([look;disarm], σ2)= 〈s7, {s7}〉,
Φ̂([look; turn], σ2)= 〈s1, {s1}〉,
Φ̂([look; turn;disarm], σ2)= 〈s3, {s3}〉.

(2.7)
Based on the above computation we have the following:
D1 6|=rAK Knows disarmed after [look;disarm] and
D1 6|=rAK Knows disarmed after [look; turn;disarm].
In Proposition A.1 (Appendix A) we show that there exists no sequence of actions α ofD1
such that D1 |=rAK Knows disarmed ∧¬exploded after α.
Let us now consider the conditional plan:
look;
Case
¬locked→ turn
locked→[]
Endcase
= c1
disarm

= c
We will show that D1 |=rAK Knows disarmed ∧¬exploded after c.
From the definition of Φ̂ and the computation of Φ̂ in (2.7), we have the following:
Φ̂(c, σ1) = Φ̂(c1;disarm, Φ̂(look, σ1))= Φ̂(c1;disarm,Φ(look, σ1))
= Φ̂(c1;disarm, 〈s1, {s1}〉)= Φ̂(disarm, Φ̂(c1, 〈s1, {s1}〉))
= Φ̂(disarm, Φ̂(turn, 〈s1, {s1}〉))
(because ¬locked is known to be true in 〈s1, {s1}〉)
= Φ̂(disarm,Φ(turn, 〈s1, {s1}〉))
= Φ̂(disarm, 〈s2, {s2}〉))=Φ(disarm, 〈s2, {s2}〉))
= 〈s7, {s7}〉
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and
Φ̂(c, σ2) = Φ̂(c1;disarm, Φ̂(look, σ2))= Φ̂(c1;disarm,Φ(look, σ2))
= Φ̂(c1;disarm, 〈s2, {s2}〉)= Φ̂(disarm, Φ̂(c1, 〈s2, {s2}〉))
= Φ̂(disarm, Φ̂([], 〈s2, {s2}〉))
(because locked is known to be true in 〈s2, {s2}〉)
= Φ̂(disarm, 〈s2, {s2}〉))=Φ(disarm, 〈s2, {s2}〉))
= 〈s7, {s7}〉.
So, Φ̂(c, σ1) = 〈s7, {s7}〉 and Φ̂(c, σ2) = 〈s7, {s7}〉. Since disarmed ∧ ¬exploded is
known to be true in the c-state 〈s7, {s7}〉, by Definition 6, D1 |=rAK Knows disarmed ∧¬exploded after c.
2.3. Translating domain descriptions to first-order theories
In this section we give a translation of domain descriptions (D) in AK to theories in
first-order logic (R(D)), and then show that the translation is sound and complete with
respect toAK when answering queries in the language ofAK . Our translation fromD into
R(D) is inspired by the translation of Kartha [25], and uses axioms and notations from [49]
and [47]. In this section we use the standard notation of having variables start with small
letters and constants start with capital letters. To be consistent we use the same notation for
domain descriptions.
Let us consider a domain description D. Assume that D contains
(1) n sensing actions K1, . . . ,Kn with the k-propositions Ki determines Fi for (1 6
i 6 n), and
(2) m value-propositions initiallyGi for (16 i 6m).
For simplicity, we also assume that each action A in D occurs in at least one executability
condition and each sensing action Ki occurs in only one k-proposition. Then, the domain
descriptionD can be translated into a many-sorted theory R(D) as follows.
Objects of R(D) are of the sorts: action, fluent, and situation. To distinguish with
states—which are often denoted by s (possibly with subscripts)—in the previous sections,
we use s or S (possibly with subscripts) to denote situations. The vocabulary (signature)
of R(D) consists of the following:
• a constant S0 of type situation;
• constants A of type “action” which correspond to different actions from D (one
constant for each action);
• constants F of type “fluent” which correspond to different fluents from D (one
constant for each fluent);
• a function symbol do of the type 〈action× situation→ situation〉;
• a predicate symbol Holds of the type 〈fluent, situation〉;
• a predicate symbol K of the type 〈situation, situation〉;
We will need the following notations.
• For a fluent F , Holds(¬F, s) stands for ¬Holds(F, s).
• For a conjunction of literals %= P1∧· · ·∧Pn, Holds(%, s) denotes∧ni=1 Holds(Pi, s).
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• For each fluent F and action A,
γ+F (A, s)
def≡
∨
“A causes F if %”∈D
Holds(%, s),
γ−F (A, s)
def≡
∨
“A causes ¬F if %”∈D
Holds(%, s), and
Poss(A, s)
def≡
∨
“executable A if %”∈D
Holds(%, s).
The axioms of R(D) are described below.
(1) The successor state axiom—using Reiter’s formulation in [47]—for an ordinary
fluent F and an action A is given by:
Poss(A, s)⊃
[Holds(F,do(A, s))≡ γ+F (A, s)∨ (Holds(F, s)∧¬γ−F (A, s))]. (2.8)
(2) The successor state axiom for K (borrowed from [49]) and an action A is given by:
Poss(A, s)⊃
[
K(s′′,do(A, s))≡
∃s′ (K(s′, s)∧ Poss(A, s′)∧ (s′′ = do(A, s′)))∧((
n∧
j=1
A 6=Kj
)
∨ (2.9)
(
n∨
j=1
(A=Kj ∧Holds(Fj , s)≡Holds(Fj , s′))
))]
,
where, recall that, K1, . . . ,Kn are the sensing actions in D that determine
F1, . . . ,Fn respectively.
(3) For i = 1, . . . ,m, R(D) contains
Holds(Gi,S0) (2.10)
where, recall that, G1, . . . ,Gm, are the only fluent literals known to be true in the
initial state.
(4) The following axioms are for the accessibility relation in the initial situation:
K(s,S0)⊃
m∧
i=1
Holds(Gi, s) (2.11)
and
K(S0,S0). (2.12)
(5) The domain closure assumption (DCA) for fluents:∨
F∈F
f = F.
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(6) The domain closure assumption (DCA) for actions:∨
A∈A
a =A.
(7) The unique name assumption (UNA) for fluents:∧
F1,F2∈F
F1,F2 distinct
F1 6= F2.
(8) The unique name assumption (UNA) for actions:∧
A1,A2∈A
A1,A2 distinct
A1 6=A2.
We now relate the entailment inD and the entailment in R(D), for queries regarding fluent
values after a sequence of actions. We use the following notation:
• Holds(ϕ, s) is a shorthand for a corresponding formula of Holds with only fluents
as its first argument. For example, Holds(f1 ∨ f2, s) denotes Holds(f1, s) ∨
Holds(f2, s). Similarly, Holds(f1 ∧ f2, s) denotes Holds(f1, s) ∧ Holds(f2, s), and
as we mentioned before Holds(¬f, s) denotes ¬Holds(f, s).
• Knows (ϕ,S) denotes the formula: ∀s′(K(s′,S)⊃Holds(ϕ, s′)).
• For a sequence of actions α = [a1; . . . ;ak]
do([], s) denotes s,
do(α, s) denotes do(ak,do(ak−1, . . . ,do(a1, s))),
Poss([], s)≡ true, and
Poss(α, s) denotes
k∧
i=1
Poss(ai,do([a1; . . . ;ai−1], s)).
Proposition 2. LetD be a domain description, ϕ be a fluent formula, and α be a sequence
of actions of D. Then,
D |=AK Knows ϕ after α iff R(D) |= Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0))∧ Poss(α,S0).
Proof. In Appendix B. 2
Our next step is to relate D and R(D) for queries with conditional plans. For
that we introduce a three-sorted predicate Apply(c, s, s′), whose intuitive meaning is
that the conditional plan c executed in situation s takes us to the situation s′. For
example, let c be the conditional plan in Example 3, and s be a situation where
¬locked holds in the real world. Then Apply(c, s,do(disarm,do(turn,do(look, s)))) will
be true. Intuitively, this means that when c is executed in s, we reach the situation
do(disarm,do(turn,do(look, s))), or if c were to be executed in s, then the action sequence
that would be executed from left to right is look; turn;disarm.
The definition of ‘Apply’ is similar to the formula ‘Rdo’ in [31]. In our formulation,
we will represent a case plan as a list of pairs of conditions and conditional plans using
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three constructor functions: one that constructs a list, another that constructs a pair, and
one that constructs a case plan. Any conditional plan can be represented as a list of
actions and case plans. For example, the conditional plan c in Example 3 is represented
by [look; case([([¬locked], [turn]), ([locked], [])]); disarm]. We now define Apply as a
nested abnormality theory (NAT) [33] block.
BApply =
{min Apply :
Apply([], s, s)
Poss(a, s)∧ Apply(α,do(a, s), s′)⊃ Apply([a|α], s, s′)
¬Poss(a, s)⊃ Apply([a|α], s, ⊥)
Apply([case([])|c], s, ⊥)
Apply(c,⊥,⊥)
Knows (ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c, s, s′)∧ Apply(c′′, s′, s′′)⊃
Apply([case([(ϕ, c)|r ′])|c′′], s, s′′)
¬Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply([case(r ′)|c′′], s, s′))⊃
Apply([case([(ϕ, c)|r ′])|c′′], s, s′)
}
In the above nested abnormality theory c and c′′ are conditional plans while r ′ is a list of
pairs of conditions and conditional plans. (Note that case(r ′) will denote a conditional
plan.) The above NAT defines the predicate Apply using circumscription and can be
equivalently written as Circ(T ;Apply), where T is the set of seven axioms following
“min Apply :” in BApply. That is, we consider only models of T in which the predicate
Apply is minimized. This guarantees that every situation is the result of execution of a
conditional plan from the initial situation. For more on nested abnormal theories, please
see Appendix E.
The NAT BApply can be defined in words as follows:
• Apply([], s, s) is true, for all s.
• For all a,α, s, s′, Apply([a|α], s, s′) is true if Apply(α,do(a, s), s′) ∧ Poss(a, s) is
true.
• For all a,α, s, s′, Apply([a|α], s,⊥) is true if Apply(α,do(a, s), s′) ∧ ¬Poss(a, s) is
true.
• Apply([case([])|c], s,⊥) is true for all c and s.
• Apply(c,⊥,⊥) is true for all c.
• For all ϕ, s, s′, s′′, c, r ′, c′′, Apply([case([(ϕ, c)|r ′])|c′′], s, s′′) is true
if Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c, s, s′)∧ Apply(c′′, s′, s′′) is true.
• For all ϕ, s, s′, c, r ′, c′′, Apply([case([(ϕ, c)|r ′])|c′′], s, s′) is true if ¬Knows(ϕ, s) ∧
Apply([case(r ′)|c′′], s, s′)) is true.
• If none of the above rules is applicable then Apply(c, s, s′) is false.
We now explain how the above definition entails Apply([a1;a2;a3], s,do(a3,do(a2,
do(a1, s)))), assuming that Poss([a1;a2;a3], s) is true. We have that
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• Apply([a1;a2;a3], s,do(a1,do(a2, do(a3, s)))) is true if Poss(a1, s) and
Apply([a2;a3],do(a1, s),do(a3,do(a2,do(a1, s)))) is true (using the second rule).
• Apply([a2;a3],do(a1, s),do(a1,do(a2,do(a3, s)))) is true if Poss(a2,do(a1, s)) and
Apply([a3],do(a2,do(a1, s)),do(a3,do(a2,do(a1, s)))) is true (using the second
rule).
• Apply([a3],do(a2,do(a1, s)),do(a1,do(a2,do(a3, s)))) is true if Poss([a1;a2;a3], s)
and Apply([],do(a3,do(a2,do(a1, s))),do(a3,do(a2,do(a1, s)))) is true (using the
second rule).
• Apply([],do(a3,do(a2,do(a1, s))),do(a3,do(a2,do(a1, s)))) is true (using the first
rule).
Proposition 3. Let D be a domain description and R(D) be the corresponding first-order
theory. Let c be a conditional plan and ϕ be a fluent formula. Then,
D |=Knows ϕ after c iff
R(D) ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥ .
Proof. In Appendix B. 2
We would like to point out that the above proposition also holds for a slightly different
translation R1(D), where we use the following simpler successor state axiom—based on
the formulas (1.5) and (1.6) of Section 1.3—instead of the successor state axiom (2.9):
Poss(x, s)∧ Poss(x, s′)⊃[
K(do(x, s′),do(x, s))≡(
K(s′, s)∧((
n∧
j=1
x 6=Kj
)
∨
(
n∨
j=1
(
x =Kj ∧Holds(Fj , s)≡Holds(Fj , s′)
))))]
.
(2.13)
2.4. State space analysis
In this section we analyze the size of the state space, when reasoning in AK .
• It is easy to see that when we have n fluents, we will have 22n+n c-states and 22n+n−1
grounded c-states.
• Now suppose out of the n fluents, in the initial situation we do not know the truth
value of p (p 6 n) fluents. I.e., we know the truth value of n− p fluents. Then in all
initial c-states 〈s,Σ〉, the size ofΣ will be less than 2p. It follows from the definition
of the transition function and the fact that we do not have any knowledge loosing
actions that any c-state that can be reached by executing a sequence of actions in the
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initial c-state will also have the size of its Σ less than 2p. Taking this into account the
size of the reachable (from the initial c-states) state space will be:(
2n
1
)
+ 2×
(
2n
2
)
+ · · · + 2p ×
(
2n
2p
)
which is larger than 22p .
• If we consider the formulations in [41,49] the ‘states’ will be Kripke models. In
that case for n fluents, we will have at least 2n different possible worlds, and the
accessibility relation will be a subset of 2n×2n = 22n elements. Thus the total number
of different Kripke models will be 2n × 222n = 222n+n.
• Recently complexity results about planning in presence of incomplete information
have been developed in [8]. One of the results is that the polynomial plan existence
problem is 6P2 -complete in presence of incomplete knowledge about the initial
situation and the restriction that sensing actions are executed a limited number
(bounded by a constant) of times, when looking for feasible (polynomial length)
plans. Without the restrictions the complexity is higher.
The tremendously large size of the state space for AK and also for the formulations
in [38,49], and the above mentioned complexity results necessitates search for (provably
sound) approximations that have a more manageable state space and a lower complexity.
This is our focus in the next section.
3. Approximating AK
In this section we define several approximations of the semantics of AK . In our
approximations we will use 3-valued states, which we will call a-states (or approximate
states), to represent the state of knowledge of an agent. An a-state will be normally
represented by a pair 〈T ,F 〉, where T and F are disjoint sets of fluents. Intuitively, T
(respectively F ) is the set of fluents which are true (respectively false) in the state 〈T ,F 〉.
An a-state 〈T ,F 〉 is said to be complete if T ∪ F is the set of all the fluents in the domain
description. Often we will abuse notation to represent a complete a-state 〈T ,F 〉, by just T .
Let σ1 = 〈T1,F1〉 and σ2 = 〈T2,F2〉 be two a-states. We say that an a-state 〈T1,F1〉 extends
the a-state 〈T2,F2〉, denoted by σ2  σ1, if T2 ⊆ T1 and F2 ⊆ F1. If σ1 extends σ2, we also
say that σ1 is an extension of σ2. σ1∩σ2 will denote the pair 〈T1 ∩T2,F1 ∩F2〉 and σ1 \σ2
denotes the set (T1 \ T2) ∪ (F1 \ F2). For a set of fluents X we write X \ 〈T ,F 〉 to denote
X \ (T ∪ F).
Given a fluent f and an a-state σ = 〈T ,F 〉, we say that f is true (respectively false) in
σ if f ∈ T (respectively f ∈ F ); and f is known (respectively unknown) in σ if f ∈ T ∪F
(respectively f /∈ T ∪ F ). A positive (respectively negative) fluent literal f is said to hold
in 〈T ,F 〉 if f ∈ T (respectively f ∈ F ).
We are now ready to define several approximations for AK . The difference between the
approximations is based on how much case analysis is done to reason about actions when
the agent has incomplete knowledge about the world. We start with the 0-Approximation
where no case analysis is done.
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3.1. 0-Approximation
Let D be a domain description, 〈T ,F 〉 be an a-state, and f be a fluent in D. f
(respectively¬f ) is said to possibly hold in 〈T ,F 〉 if f /∈ F (respectively f /∈ T ). A set of
fluent literals {f1, . . . , fn} is said to possibly hold in 〈T ,F 〉 if for all i , fi possibly holds
in 〈T ,F 〉. An action a is said to be 0-executable in an a-state 〈T ,F 〉 if there exists an
ex-proposition executable a if p1, . . . , pn, such that p1, . . . , pn hold in 〈T ,F 〉. We now
introduce several notations.
• e+a (〈T ,F 〉) = {f | f is a fluent and there exists “a causesf if p1, . . . , pn” in D such
that p1, . . . , pn hold in 〈T ,F 〉}.
• e−a (〈T ,F 〉) = {f | f is a fluent and there exists “a causes¬f if p1, . . . , pn” in D
such that p1, . . . , pn hold in 〈T ,F 〉}.
• F+a (〈T ,F 〉)= {f | f is a fluent and there exists “a causesf if p1, . . . , pn” in D such
that p1, . . . , pn possibly hold in 〈T ,F 〉}.
• F−a (〈T ,F 〉) = {f | f is a fluent and there exists “a causes¬f if p1, . . . , pn” in D
such that p1, . . . , pn possibly hold in 〈T ,F 〉}.
• K(a, 〈T ,F 〉)= {f | f is a fluent and “a determines f ” in D}.
Intuitively, e+a (〈T ,F 〉) (respectively e−a (〈T ,F 〉)) is the set of fluents that must be true
(respectively false) after executing a in 〈T ,F 〉; F+a (〈T ,F 〉) (respectively F−a (〈T ,F 〉)) is
the set of fluents that may be true (respectively false) after executing a in 〈T ,F 〉; and
K(a, 〈T ,F 〉) is the set of fluents which become known after executing the action a in
〈T ,F 〉.
We define the result function ofD in the 0-Approximation, denoted by Res0, as follows.
Res0(a, 〈T ,F 〉)=
〈
T ∪ e+a (〈T ,F 〉) \ F−a (〈T ,F 〉),F ∪ e−a (〈T ,F 〉) \F+a (〈T ,F 〉)
〉
.
We illustrate these definitions in the next example.
Example 4. For the domain description D1 from Example 1, the initial a-state is σ0 =
〈∅, {disarmed, exploded}〉.
Since neither locked nor ¬locked holds in σ0, we have that
e+disarm(σ0)= ∅, e−disarm(σ0)= ∅,
e+turn(σ0)= ∅, e−turn(σ0)= ∅.
Since locked and ¬locked possibly hold in σ0, we have that
F+disarm(σ0)= {exploded,disarmed}, F−disarm(σ0)= ∅,
F+turn(σ0)= {locked}, F−turn(σ0)= {locked}
and
K(look, σ0)= {locked}.
Since there is no ef-proposition whose action is look, we have that e+look(σ0)= e−look(σ0)=
F+look(σ0)= F−look(σ0)= ∅. Hence,
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Res0(disarm, σ0)= 〈∅,∅〉,
Res0(turn, σ0)= 〈∅, {disarmed, exploded}〉,
Res0(look, σ0)= 〈∅, {disarmed, exploded}〉.
In the above example, even though disarmed and exploded were false in σ0, after
executing disarm they become unknown. On the face of it this is counter to the intuition
behind the frame problem, where the values of fluents remain unchanged from one situation
to another, unless the action in between changes them. In this case the action disarm has
two effect propositions, neither of which is applicable as their preconditions (¬locked and
locked respectively) do not hold. So a naive application of the frame axiom would lead us to
conclude that disarmed and exploded remain false in the situation after executing disarm
in σ0. But such a conclusion is not sound, as it is possible that in the real world locked
was true and thus after executing disarm, disarmed became true. Based on this possibility,
we can not just have disarmed to be true in the resultant situation either, as this would be
unsound if ¬locked was true in the real world instead. Thus taking into account the two
possibilities, we can reason that the agent will not know whether disarmed is true or false
after executing disarm. Thus, the resultant a-state should have disarmed as unknown. Our
not so straightforward definition of Res0, encodes this skeptical reasoning. We now use
Res0 to define the transition function Φ0. Again, executing an action might result in an
undefined a-state, denoted by ⊥.
Definition 7. Given a domain description D, the 0-transition function Φ0 of D is defined
as follows:
• If a is not 0-executable in σ , then Φ0(a, σ )= {⊥};
• If a is 0-executable in σ and a is a non-sensing action then Φ0(a, σ )= {Res0(a, σ )};
and
• If a is 0-executable in σ and a is a sensing action then Φ0(a, σ )= {σ ′ | σ  σ ′ and
K(a,σ) \ σ = σ ′ \ σ }.
In the above definition, the transition due to a sensing action results in a set of a-states,
each corresponding to a particular set of sensing results. The condition that all elements
of σ ′ \ σ are from K(a,σ) makes sure that only fluents that are sensed are the ones for
which we have a k-proposition and the condition that all elements of K(a,σ) are in σ ′ \ σ
makes sure that all fluents mentioned in the k-propositions for that action have a true or
false value in σ ′. If we were to allow actions to be able to both sense and change the world,
then Φ0(a, σ ) for such an action can be succinctly defined as: Φ0(a, σ )= {σ ′ | σ ′ extends
Res0(a, σ ) and σ ′ \ Res0(a, σ )=K(a,σ) \ Res0(a, σ )}.
Let Φ0 be a 0-transition function of D. The 0-extended transition function Φ̂0 which
maps pairs of conditional plans and a-states into set of a-states is defined next.
Definition 8.
(1) Φ̂0([], σ )= {σ }.
(2) Φ̂0(a, σ )=Φ0(a, σ ).
(3) For a case plan
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c= Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕn→ pn
Endcase
Φ̂0(c, σ )=
 Φ̂0(pj , σ ) if ϕj holds in σ,{⊥} if none of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn holds in σ.
(4) For two conditional plans c1 and c2, Φ̂0([c1; c2], σ )=⋃σ ′∈Φ̂0(c1,σ ) Φ̂0(c2, σ ′).
(5) Φ̂0(c,⊥)= {⊥}.
A conditional plan c is 0-executable in an a-state σ if ⊥ /∈ Φ̂0(c, σ ). An a-state σ0 is
called an initial a-state of D if for any fluent literal f , f holds in σ0 iff “initiallyf ” is in
D. It is easy to see that for each domain description, the initial a-state is unique.
Definition 9. Given a domain description D, a 0-model is a pair (σ0,Φ0) where σ0 is the
initial a-state of D and Φ0 is a 0-transition function of D.
Similarly to Proposition 1, we can prove that the 0-transition functionΦ0 ofD is unique.
In the next definition, we define our first approximate entailment relation, the 0-entailment
(|=0), based on the 0-model.
Definition 10. LetD be a domain description, ϕ be a fluent formula, and c be a conditional
plan in D. We say
• D |=0 Knows ϕ after c if c is 0-executable in σ0 and ϕ holds in every a-state
belonging to Φ̂0(c, σ0) for every 0-model (σ0,Φ0) of D; and
• D |=0 Kwhether ϕ after c if c is 0-executable σ0 and ϕ is known in every a-state
belonging to Φ̂0(c, σ0) for every 0-model (σ0,Φ0) of D.
Example 5. For the domain descriptionD1 we have that
Φ0(disarm, σ0) = {〈∅,∅〉},
Φ0(turn, σ0) = {〈∅, {disarmed, exploded}〉},
Φ0(look, σ0) = {〈{locked}, {disarmed, exploded}〉,
〈∅, {locked,disarmed, exploded}〉}.
Thus D1 |=0 Kwhether locked after look but D1 6|=0 Knows locked after look and
D1 6|=0 Knows ¬locked after look.
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In the next example we show that the conditional plan for disarming the bomb in
Example 3 can also be analyzed using the 0-Approximation.
Example 6. Let us reconsider the domainD1 and the conditional plan of Example 3.
look;
Case
¬locked→ turn
locked→[]
Endcase
= c1
disarm

= c
We have that the initial a-state of D is σ0 = 〈∅, {disarmed, exploded}〉.
To prove that D1 |=0 Knows disarmed ∧ ¬exploded after c, we compute Φ̂0(c, σ0) as
follows.
First, since K(look, σ0) = {locked} we have that Φ0(look, σ0) = {σ1, σ2} where σ1 =
〈{locked}, {disarmed, exploded}〉 and σ2 = 〈∅, {disarmed, exploded, locked}〉.
Hence,
Φ̂0(c, σ0) =
⋃
σ ′∈Φ0(look,σ0)
Φ̂0(c1;disarm, σ ′)
= Φ̂0(c1;disarm, σ1)∪ Φ̂0(c1;disarm, σ2).
Since locked holds in σ1 and ¬locked holds in σ2, we have that Φ̂0(c1;disarm, σ1) =
Φ̂0(disarm, σ1) and Φ̂0(c1;disarm, σ2)=⋃σ ′∈Φ̂0(turn,σ2) Φ̂0(disarm, σ ′).
Furthermore, Φ̂0(disarm, σ1) = {〈{disarmed, locked}, {exploded}〉} and Φ̂0(turn, σ2) =
Φ0(turn, σ2)= {〈{locked}, {disarmed, exploded}〉} = {σ1}.
Thus, Φ̂0(c1;disarm, σ2)= Φ̂0(disarm, σ1)= {〈{disarmed, locked}, {exploded}〉}.
In summary, we have that Φ̂0(c, σ0)= {〈{disarmed, locked}, {exploded}〉} which implies
that D1 |=0 Knows disarmed ∧¬exploded after c.
Although 0-Approximation can correctly analyze the above example, it has weaknesses
and it cannot entail many queries entailed by the AK semantics. The following example
illustrates this.
Example 7. Let us consider the domain D3 with the following causal rules;
a causesf if g
a causesf if ¬g
executable a
=D3
The initial a-state of D3 is σ0 = 〈∅,∅〉. Intuitively, we would expect that Knows f after a
is entailed by D3 and this entailment holds for |=rAK . However, Φ̂0(a, σ0)=Φ0(a, σ0)={〈∅,∅〉} because e+a (σ0) = e−a (σ0) = F−a (σ0) = ∅ and F+a (σ0) = {f }. This means that
D3 6|=0 Knowsf after a.
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In the above example, by doing case analysis we can intuitively conclude that f should
be true after executing a in the initial situation. I.e., we analyze that in the initial situation
g could be either true or false, and in both cases we can conclude that f will be true
after executing a. The reasoning mechanism in the 0-Approximation lacks any such case
analysis. In the next section we introduce the notion of 1-Approximation that does some
case analysis and is able to make the intuitive conclusion in the above example.
3.2. 1-Approximation
The 1-Approximation improves on 0-Approximation by defining a new result function
which given an incomplete a-state σ and an action a, considers all complete extensions of
σ , and applies a to these extensions and then considers what is true and what is false in all
the resulting states. Such a transition function does intuitive reasoning with respect to the
Example 7. We now formally define the new result function. For an a-state σ , let Comp(σ )
be the set of all the complete a-states that extend σ . The result function, Res1, which maps
a pair of an action a and an a-state σ into an a-state Res1(a, σ ) is defined as follows.
Res1(a, σ )=
⋂
σ ′∈Comp(σ )
Res0(a, σ ′).
The notion of executability changes slightly. Now, an action a is said to be 1-executable
in an a-state σ if it is 0-executable in all a-states in Comp(σ ). The 1-transition function is
defined next.
Definition 11. Given a domain descriptionD, the 1-transition functionΦ1 ofD is defined
as follows:
• If a is not 1-executable in σ then Φ1(a, σ )= {⊥}.
• If a is 1-executable in σ and a is a non-sensing action then Φ1(a, σ )= {Res1(a, σ )}.
• If a is 1-executable in σ and a is a sensing action then Φ1(a, σ )= {σ ′ | σ  σ ′ and
K(a,σ) \ σ = σ ′ \ σ }.
A 1-model of D is then defined as a pair (σ0,Φ1) where σ0 is the initial a-state
of D and Φ1 is the 1-transition function of D. The notion of 1-extended function and
1-entailment is then defined as in Definitions 8 and 10 using 1-transition function and 1-
model, respectively.
In the next example we show that the 1-Approximation allows us to reason by cases.
Example 8. Let us consider again the domainD3 from Example 7. The initial a-state ofD3
is σ0 = 〈∅,∅〉. The set of complete extensions of σ0, Comp(σ0), is the set of all complete
a-states of D3. More precisely, Comp(σ0)= {σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4} where σ1 = 〈{f,g},∅〉, σ2 =
〈{f }, {g}〉, σ3 = 〈∅, {f,g}〉, and σ4 = 〈{g}, {f }〉.
Since Res0(a, σ1) = 〈{f,g},∅〉, Res0(a, σ2) = 〈{f }, {g}〉, Res0(a, σ3) = 〈{f }, {g}〉,
and Res0(a, σ4) = 〈{f,g},∅〉 we have that Res1(a, σ0) = 〈{f },∅〉. Thus, for any 1-
model (σ0,Φ1) of D3, Φ1(a, σ0) = {〈{f },∅〉}. Hence, we can conclude that D3 |=1
Knows f after a.
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We now state the relation between the 0-Approximation and the 1-Approximation of
domain descriptions of AK .
Proposition 4 (Soundness of |=0 with respect to |=1). Let D be a domain description, ϕ
be a fluent formula of D, and c be a conditional plan. Then,
if D |=0 Knows ϕ after c then D |=1 Knows ϕ after c.
Proof. (Sketch 4). Similar to Proposition 1 we can prove that for every domain description
D, 5 the 0-model and 1-model of D are uniquely determined. Furthermore, the initial a-
state in the 0-Approximation is also the initial a-state in the 1-Approximation. Let us denote
the 0-model and 1-model of D by (σ0,Φ0) and (σ0,Φ1) respectively. Let σ and δ be two
a-states of D such that σ  δ. Then, for every action a of D, we can prove that
(i) for each σ ′ ∈Φ0(a, σ ) there exists a δ′ ∈Φ1(a, δ) such that σ ′  δ′;
(ii) for each δ′ ∈Φ1(a, δ) there exists a σ ′ ∈Φ0(a, σ ) such that σ ′  δ′.
Using (i) and (ii) we can then prove that for any conditional plan c such that ⊥/∈ Φ̂0(c, σ ),
(iii) ⊥/∈ Φ̂1(c, δ);
(iv) for each σ ′ ∈ Φ̂0(c, σ ) there exists a δ′ ∈ Φ̂1(c, δ) such that σ ′  δ′; and
(v) for each δ′ ∈ Φ̂1(c, δ) there exists a σ ′ ∈ Φ̂0(c, σ ) such that σ ′  δ′.
(iii) proves that if c is 0-executable in σ0 then c is 1-executable in σ0. This, together with
(iv) and (v), and the fact that σ0  σ0, proves the proposition. 2
The next example shows that the 1-Approximation is also not able to make some intuitive
conclusions 6 that can be made using the AK semantics.
Example 9. Consider the domain description:
a causes p if r
a causes q if ¬r
b causesf if p
b causesf if q
executable a
executable b

=D4
The initial a-state is 〈∅,∅〉, where p,q, r, and f are unknown. Although intuitively and
also according to the rational semantics of AK , after executing a followed by b in the
initial a-state, f should be true, our 1-Approximation is not able to capture this. This is
because the 1-Approximation reasons by cases only up to 1 level. Since after reasoning by
cases for 1 level, it summarizes its reasoning to a pair 〈T ,F 〉, it is not able to capture the
fact that after executing a in the initial a-state p ∨ q is true.
To overcome the limitation of 1-Approximation as illustrated by the above example, we
can define 2-Approximation which will reason by cases up to 2 levels. But it will break
4 The full proof can be found in [51].
5 Recall that we do not allow contradictory v-propositions or contradictory ef-propositions in D.
6 We thank the anonymous AAAI-97 reviewer who pointed this out.
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down when reasoning by cases up to 3 levels is necessary, and so on. In the next section,
we define ω-Approximation which allows reasoning by cases for multiple levels without
setting a limit on the number of levels.
3.3. ω-Approximation
Our intention in ω-Approximation is to reason by cases to as many levels as possible.
But this number is limited by the structure of the plan. We can only reason by cases
through sequences of non-sensing actions. For that reason, given a sequence of actions
α = a1; . . . ;an, we now define the longest prefix of α consisting of only non-sensing
actions or a single sensing action, denoted by pre(α), as follows:
• if a1 is a sensing action then pre(α)= a1; or
• if α does not contain a sensing action then pre(α)= α; or
• if aj is the first sensing action in α, 1< j 6 n, then pre(α)= a1, . . . , aj−1.
The sequence of actions obtained from α after removing its prefix pre(α) is called the
remainder of α and is denoted by rem(α).
Given a sequence of non-sensing actions α = a1, . . . , an, we now define Resω(α,σ ) by
considering all complete extensions of σ , applying α to each of them and then determining
their intersection. This corresponds to doing case by case reasoning for n levels. More
formally,
Resω(α,σ )=
⋂
σ ′∈Comp(σ )
Res0(an,Res0(an−1, . . . ,Res0(a1, σ ′))).
An action a is ω-executable in σ if a is 0-executable in all complete extensions of σ . And, a
sequence of non-sensing actions α is ω-executable in σ if α is 0-executable in all complete
extensions of σ .
The ω-Approximation of D is defined by a function Φω , called ω-transition function,
which maps a pair of a sequence of actions α and an a-state σ into a set of a-states, denoted
by Φω(α,σ), as follows.
Φω(α,σ)=

{⊥} if pre(α) is not ω-executable in σ ;
{Resω(α,σ )} if α does not contain a sensing action and
is ω-executable in σ ;
{σ ′ | σ ′ extends σ, and σ ′ \ σ =K(a,σ) \ σ }
if α = a, a is a sensing action,
and a is ω-executable in σ ; and⋃
σ ′∈Φω(pre(α),σ ) Φω(rem(α), σ
′), otherwise.
A sequence of actions α is ω-executable in σ if ⊥/∈Φω(α,σ).
An ω-model for a domain description D is then defined as the pair (σ0,Φω), where σ0
is the initial a-state of D and Φω is an ω-transition function of D.
To extend the function Φω over pairs of conditional plans and a-states we need the
following observation.
Observation 3.1. Every conditional plan c can be represented as a sequence of conditional
plans c1; . . . ; cn where
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(a) ci is either a sequence of actions or a case plan; and
(b) for every i < n, if ci is a sequence of actions then ci+1 is a case plan.
From now on, we will often write a conditional plan c as a sequence c = c1; . . . ; cn
where ci ’s satisfy the conditions (a) and (b) of Observation 3.1.
The extended transition function of Φω , denoted by Φ̂ω , is defined next.
For a conditional plan c and an a-state σ , we define
(1) for c= c1, where c1 is a sequence of actions, Φ̂ω(c, σ )=Φω(c1, σ );
(2) for
c = Case
ϕ1→ c1
. . .
ϕl→ cl
Endcase,
Φ̂ω(c, σ )=
{
Φ̂ω(ci, σ ) if ϕi holds in σ ,
{⊥} if none of ϕ1, . . . , ϕl holds in σ ;
(3) for c= c1; c2; . . . ; cn, n > 1,
(a) if c1 is a sequence of actions,
Φ̂ω(c, σ )=
⋃
σ ′∈Φ̂ω(c1,σ )
Φ̂ω(c2; . . . ; cn, σ ′),
(b) if
c1 = Case
ϕ1→ p1
. . .
ϕm→ pm
Endcase,
Φ̂ω(c, σ )=

⋃
σ ′∈Φ̂ω(pi,σ ) Φ̂ω(c2; . . . ; cn, σ ′)
if ϕi holds in σ,
{⊥} if none of ϕ1, . . . , ϕm holds in σ ;
(4) Φ̂ω(c,⊥)= {⊥} for every conditional plan c.
The notion of ω-entailment is then defined as in Definition 10 using the ω-model.
The next example shows that this generalization indeed overcomes the problem of 1-
Approximation in Example 9, through reasoning by cases for multiple levels.
Example 10. Let us consider the domain description D4 from Example 9. Let σ be a
complete extension of σ0. Since σ is complete, either r or ¬r holds in σ . Thus, either p or
q holds in Res0(a, σ ). This implies that e+b (Res0(a, σ ))= {f }. Since D4 does not contain
an ef-proposition, whose effect is ¬f , we have that F−b (Res0(a, σ ))= ∅. Hence, f holds
in Res0(b,Res0(a, σ )) for every complete a-state σ . Thus f holds in Resω([a;b], σ0).
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By definition of Φω , we have that f holds in Φω([a;b], σ0) where σ0 is the initial a-
state of D4. Since a;b is a sequence of actions, Φ̂ω([a;b], σ0) = Φω([a;b], σ0). Thus,
D4 |=ω Knows f after [a;b].
We prove the soundness of |=1 with respect to |=ω in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 (Soundness of |=1 with respect to |=ω). Let D be a domain description, ϕ
be a fluent formula, and c be a conditional plan. Then,
if D |=1 Knows ϕ after c then D |=ω Knows ϕ after c.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 4. The proof can be found
in [51]. 2
3.4. Soundness of 0-, 1- and ω-Approximations with respect to AK -semantics
In the previous subsections we discussed three different approximations of AK . Our
next goal is to show that these approximations are sound with respect to AK . Since we
have already shown in Propositions 4 and 5 that |=0 is sound with respect to |=1 and |=1
is sound with respect to |=ω , we will now show that the ω-Approximation is sound with
respect to AK .
Proposition 6 (Soundness of |=ω with respect to |=AK ). Let D be a domain description,
ϕ be a fluent formula, and c be a conditional plan. Then,
if D |=ω Knows ϕ after c then D |=AK Knows ϕ after c.
Proof. In Appendix C. 2
Even thoughω-Approximation can reason more than the 1-Approximation, it still cannot
match the AK semantics. The following example illustrates this.
Example 11. Let D5 be the following domain description.
a causes ¬p if r
b determines r
c causes p if r
initially p
executable a
executable b
executable c

=D5
We have that σ0 = 〈{p},∅〉 is the initial a-state of D5.
Let α = [a;b; c].
There are two complete extensions of σ0: σ1 = 〈{p}, {r}〉 and σ2 = 〈{p, r},∅〉. This
implies that Resω(a,σ0) = Res0(a, σ1) ∩ Res0(a, σ2) = 〈{p}, {r}〉 ∩ 〈{r}, {p}〉 = 〈∅,∅〉.
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Furthermore, Φω(b, 〈∅,∅〉) = {〈{r},∅〉, 〈∅, {r}〉}, and Φω(c, 〈{r},∅〉) = {〈{p, r},∅〉} and
Φω(c, 〈∅, {r}〉)= {〈∅, {r}〉}.
Since
Φˆω(α,σ0)=Φω(α,σ0) =
⋃
σ∈Φω(a,σ0)
Φω([b; c], σ )=Φω([b; c], 〈∅,∅〉)
=
⋃
σ∈Φω(b,〈∅,∅〉)
Φω(c, σ )=Φω(c, 〈{r},∅〉)∪Φω(c, 〈∅, {r}〉)
= {〈{p, r},∅〉, 〈∅, {r}〉},
we have that D5 6|=ω Knows p after [a;b; c] and D5 6|=ω Knows ¬p after [a;b; c].
Now, we will show thatD5 |=rAK Knows p after [a;b; c]. Let s1 = {p}, s2 = {p, r}, and
s3 = {r}. D5 has two initial c-states: 〈s1, {s1, s2}〉 and 〈s2, {s1, s2}〉. We have that
Φ̂([a;b; c], 〈s1, {s1, s2}〉) = Φ̂([b; c], 〈s1, {s1, s3}〉)= Φ̂(c, 〈s1, {s1}〉)= 〈s1, {s1}〉
and
Φ̂([a;b; c], 〈s2, {s1, s2}〉) = Φ̂([b; c], 〈s3, {s1, s3}〉)= Φ̂(c, 〈s3, {s3}〉)= 〈s2, {s2}〉.
It is easy to check that p is known to be true in Φ̂([a;b; c], 〈s1, {s1, s2}〉) and
Φ̂([a;b; c], 〈s2, {s1, s2}〉). Thus D5 |=rAK Knows p after [a;b; c].
3.5. Complexity of progression
In this subsection we will compare the complexity of progression in the various
approximations. Suppose the number of fluents we have is n, and d is the size of the domain
description. Given an a-state 〈T ,F 〉, such that the size of T ∪ F is m, the complexity of
computing Res, Res0, Res1, and Resω in the different approximations are as follows:
• 0-Approximation: The complexity of computing Res0(a, σ ) is m × number of ef-
propositions in the domain description. This is of the order of m× d .
• 1-Approximation: Here we need to compute Res1. This is of the order of 2n−m×m×
d .
• ω-Approximation: Here we also need to compute Resω. This is also of the order of
2n−m ×m× d .
It is easy to see that if a sensing action a determines p fluents and σ is a-state where
none of these fluents are known, then Φ0(a, σ ), Φ1(a, σ ), Φω(a,σ ) will have 2p a-states.
From the above analysis, it is clear that progression can be done much faster in the 0-
Approximation than in the other two. On the other hand there is no significant difference
in doing progression between 1-Approximation and ω-Approximation. (A more formal
result was recently given in [8], where it was shown that while computing the next state
Res0(a, σ ) is a polynomial time procedure, computing Res1(a, σ ) is coNP-complete.)
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4. Related research
In this section we first discuss the expressiveness and limitations of our formulations
in this paper as compared to other formulations in the literature and then do detailed
comparisons with works that are closest to ours.
4.1. Expressiveness and limitations of AK
Since our main goal in this paper has been to formalize sensing actions, to avoid
distractions we have on purpose limited the expressiveness of the rest of the language. For
example, we do not allow multi-valued fluents [19], static causal laws [1,35,43], concurrent
actions [2,3,37], narratives [5,42], etc. In Section 2.2 we briefly discuss how most of these
restrictions can be lifted. Besides these, we also make some additional assumptions that
limit the expressiveness of our language. We now briefly discuss these assumptions and
why we make them.
• We follow the approach in [21] in not having a full first-order language. This allows
us to avoid the additional induction axioms described in [47,48]. Although, we do not
have full first-order language we do allow variables, and propositions with variables
such as:
move(X,Y ) causes at(Y )
Here, the proposition is viewed as a ‘schema’ representing a set of propositions where
X and Y are bound. Also, we assume our domain to be finite. I.e, we assume that we
have a finite set of actions, and fluents.
• We assume that there is a single agent who is planning and acting and our interest is in
formalizing his knowledge about the world vis-à-vis the real state of the world. Unlike
in [49] we make the assumptions of the modal logic S5 and hard code it into our
semantics. This allows us to use the simpler c-states instead of using Kripke models.
Moreover, as we show in Section 2.4, this leads to a smaller state space. A similar
approach is followed in most of the chapters in [14].
• We assume the sensing actions (i.e., the operation of the sensors) to be perfect.
Bacchus, Halpern, and Levesque [7] extend the situation calculus approach in [49]
to allow for noisy sensors. In the future, we plan to extend our approach to this case.
Also, in the Operations Research literature POMDPs (partially observable Markov
decision processes) are used in formulating noisy observations. We plan to formulate
sensing actions using POMDPs and compare it with our current formulation.
• We follow the high-level language doctrine in [34] and the approach in databases
and use a limited query language. This allows us to have a simpler formulation. Our
query language can be easily extended to allow for knowledge and temporal operators
as in [23], but it is not straightforward and nor we favor the generality of allowing
quantifiers (as in [47,48]).
• In most of the paper our interest is in progression and verification of conditional
plans. In other words, given the description (possibly partial) of an initial state, a
conditional plan and a goal, we would like to verify if the given plan executed in
the initial state will take us to the goal. Because of this limited interest, we can use
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the simpler formulation in (1.5) and (1.6) instead of (1.3) and (1.4). When using the
simpler formulation we can not add an observation of the form ∃S.Knows(f,S) to
find out what S is. This is a limitation only when we use the logical formulation, and
not at the semantic level.
4.2. Relationship with Scherl and Levesque’s formulation
In Section 2.3 we gave a translation of domain descriptions in D to a first-order
theory that used Scherl and Levesque’s [49] successor-state axiom (which is based on
Moore’s [41] formulation) and showed the equivalence with respect to queries in the
language of AK . Since Scherl and Levesque directly formalize in first-order logic, their
formulation is more general than ours;
(i) in terms of allowing more general descriptions about the domain such as being able
to choose which modal logic to use, and observations about non-initial situations;
and
(ii) in terms of allowing more general queries.
On the other hand our goal in this paper has been to have a simpler formulation, perhaps
at the cost of generality. For example, the ‘state’ of the agent’s knowledge in Scherl and
Levesque’s formulation (and also in Moore’s formulation) would be a Kripke model. Since
planning in a state space where a ‘state’ is a Kripke model is more difficult, we have a
simpler notion of a ‘state’ which we call a c-state. (For instance, if we have n fluents
then the number of different Kripke models are 222n+n, while the number of different c-
states are 22n+n.) As mentioned earlier, our c-state has two components, the real state of
the world and the set of possible states that the agent thinks it may be in. Our c-state is
actually equivalent to a Kripke model when we consider the logic S5. Thus with a goal to
make things simpler we sacrifice generality and make an a-priori decision on which logic
of knowledge to use.
Also, since we develop a high-level languageAK , with an independent semantics—that
does not depend on standard logics, it can serve the role of a benchmark for languages
with sensing actions, at least for the restricted class of queries in AK . Moreover, this high-
level language makes it easier for us to prove the soundness of approximations that have a
much less and more manageable state space. By having sound and complete translations of
domain descriptions in AK to theories in first-order logic that use Scherl and Levesque’s
axioms, our sound approximations are also in a way sound approximations of Scherl and
Levesque’s formalism.
Finally, we would like to mention that loop-free robot programs of [31] are special cases
of our conditional plans. In particular, the statements seq(a, r) and branch(a, r1, r2) of [31]
can be recursively translated to conditional plans a; r and
a
Case
f → r1
¬f → r2
Endcase
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respectively. In this paper we do not allow loops in our conditional plans. But the ideas
in [31,38] can be used to extend our conditional plans to allow loops.
4.3. Relationship with Lobo et al.’s semantics
Lobo et al. in [38] have a goal similar to ours, in terms of developing a high-level
language that allows sensing actions and giving translations of it to theories in a standard
logical language. We now list some of the major differences between both approaches:
• They represent the state of an agent’s knowledge by a set of states (which they refer to
as a situation), and the transition function Φ in their model is defined such that for a
sensing action a and a situationΣ , Φ(a,Σ) is a subset ofΣ that consists of all states
which agree on the fluent values determined by the sensing action a. A drawback of
this approach is that domain descriptions have a lot of models. But more importantly,
it is possible that when a domain description has two sensing actions a and b that
determine the same fluent f , there are models Φ , such that Φ(a,Σ) 6= Φ(b,Σ) for
some Σ’s. In other words, while f may be true in all states in Φ(a,Σ), it may be
false in all states in Φ(b,Σ). We find such models unintuitive.
• The semantics of AK is more general than the semantics of Lobo et al. in the sense
that in their formulation the assumption about models being rational is hard wired into
the semantics.
• On the other hand the high-level language used by Lobo et al. is more general
than the one we are using. They allow conditional sensing through preconditions
in k-propositions. We do not allow preconditions in k-propositions but we allow
executability conditions.
• Lobo et al. give translations of their domain descriptions to theories in epistemic
logic programs [17]. We have translations to disjunctive logic programs [9,51], which
are simpler than epistemic logic programs. We also give translations to first-order
theories.
• Finally, we consider sound approximations of our language. In the later part of this
section we show our semantics to be equivalent (sometimes) to theirs. Thus our
approximations are also sound approximations of their formulation.
We now give a quick overview of the formulation in [38], restricted to the common syntax
of AK and their language. We then show that our rational semantics is equivalent to the
semantics in [38] for this restricted case. The semantics of [38] is defined through transition
functions that map pairs of actions and situations into situations where a situation is a
set of states. A situation is consistent if it is not empty. Given a domain description D,
the situation consisting of all the initial states of D, denoted by Σ0, is called the initial
situation of D. A fluent f is said to be true in a situation Σ if f ∈ s for every s ∈ Σ .
A fluent formula ϕ is said to be true in a situation Σ if ϕ is true in every state s belonging
to Σ . We will need the following definition.
Definition 12. Let Σ be a consistent situation and f a fluent. A consistent situation Σ ′ is
“f -compatible” with Σ iff
(1) Σ ′ = {σ ∈Σ | f /∈ σ }; or
(2) Σ ′ = {σ ∈Σ | f ∈ σ }
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For a domain description D, a function Φ from pairs of actions and situations into
situations is called an interpretation of D.
Definition 13. An interpretation Φ of a domain descriptionD is a model of D if and only
if
(1) for any consistent situation Σ
(a) for any non-sensing action a,
Φ(a,Σ)=
⋃
s∈Σ
{Res(a, s)};
(b) for each sensing action a, let
a determines f1
. . .
a determines fn
be the k-propositions in which a occurs. Then,
• Φ(a,Σ) must be a consistent situation; and
• Φ(a,Σ) =Σ1 ∩Σ2 ∩ · · · ∩Σn where Σi is a fi -compatible situation with
Σ for i = 1, . . . , n
(2) for any action a, Φ(a,∅)= ∅.
Lobo et al. extend the function Φ to a plan evaluation function ΓΦ(c,Σ) which allows
conditional plans. The definition of ΓΦ(c,Σ) given in [38] is very similar to the definition
of Φ̂ and we omit it here for brevity. In the following example, we show the difference
between our models and the models of Lobo et al.
Example 12. Let us consider the domain description D1 from Example 1. The states of
D1 are:
s1 = ∅, s5 = {disarmed},
s2 = {locked}, s6 = {disarmed, exploded},
s3 = {exploded}, s7 = {disarmed, locked},
s4 = {locked, exploded}, s8 = {disarmed, locked, exploded}.
The initial situation ofD1 isΣ0 = {s1, s2}. There are two locked-compatible situations with
Σ0: Σ1 = {s1} and Σ2 = {s2}. Thus, if Φ is a model of D1, then either Φ(look,Σ0)= {s1}
or Φ(look,Σ0)= {s2}, i.e., in the approach of Lobo et al. there are (at least) two different
models which differ from each other by the transition functions. On the other hand, in our
approach we have two rational models which differ only by the initial c-states.
The entailment relation with respect to Lobo et al.’s semantics is defined next.
Definition 14. D |=LTM Knows ϕ after c iff for every model Φ of D, ϕ is true in
ΓΦ(c,Σ).
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The following proposition relates Lobo et al.’s semantics with ours.
Proposition 7 (Equivalence between |=rAK and |=LTM). Let D be a domain description, ϕ
be a fluent formula in D, and c be a conditional plan in D. Then,
D |=rAK Knows ϕ after c iff D |=LTM Knows ϕ after c.
Proof. In [9,51]. 2
4.4. Past research on planning with sensing
In the past several planners have been developed that can plan (to some extent) in
presence of incompleteness, and some of these planners use sensing actions. In this section
we briefly describe a few of these planners, the semantics they use and compare it with our
semantics.
4.4.1. Golden and Weld’s work
Golden, Weld and their colleagues in [11,22,23] have developed planning languages
and planners that can plan in presence of incompleteness, use sensing actions, and plan for
‘knowledge’ goals. Two of these languages are UWL [11] and SADL [23]. We now list
some of their main contributions and compare their formulation with that of ours.
• As evident from the title ‘Representing sensing actions—the middle ground revisited’
of [23], their goal is to develop a middle ground in formulating sensing actions.
After reading Golden’s thesis [22] and communicating with him it seems that their
formulation is close to our 0-Approximation, and like 0-Approximation it does not
do the case-by-case reasoning necessary to make the desired conclusion in D3 of
Example 7. But, while they do not have a soundness result, they have implemented
and incorporated their planner into Softbot agents.
• One of their main contributions is their notion of LCW (local closed world) and
reasoning with (making inferences and updates) LCW. We do not have a similar
notion in this paper.
• They introduce a minimal but extremely useful set of knowledge-temporal goal. In
UWL, they have the annotations ‘satisfy’, ‘hands-off’ and ‘findout’ and in SADL,
they have ‘satisfy’, ‘hands-off’ and ‘initially’. Intuitively, the annotation satisfy(p)
means to reach a state where p is true and the agent knows that p is true; the
annotation hands-off (p) means that during the execution of the plan, the truth value
of p does not change; and the annotation initially(p) is used to specify the goal of
sensing the truth value of p at the time the goal is given, the idea being that after
the agent has finished executing his plan, he will know the truth value of p when he
started. They also formulate regression with respect to goals formulated using such
annotations.
We have one small reservation about their annotation ‘initially’. In [22], Golden says
that
initially(p) is not achievable by an action that changes the fluent p since such an
action only obscures the initial value p. However, changing p after determining
its initial value is fine.
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We think the above condition is restrictive because sometimes we can determine the
initial value of p, even though we change its value. Consider the case where we do
not know the value of p, and we have an action a and an action senseg whose effects
can be described as follows:
a causes g if p
a causes ¬g if ¬p
a causes p if ¬p
a causes ¬p if p
senseg determines g
Now, even though the action a changes the value of p, we can find the initial value of
p by executing the plan a; senseg .
We believe these annotations are an important contribution, and additional research
is necessary in developing a general knowledge-temporal language for representing
more expressive queries over trajectories of c-states. For example, we may want to
maintain knows-whether(p), i.e., during the execution of the plan, we do not want to
be in a state where we do not know the value of p. This is different from hands-off (p),
where we are not allowed to change the value of p, but we don’t have to know the
value of p all through the trajectory.
• An important difference between their approach and ours is that their focus is on
combining planning with execution, while our focus is more close to the classical
planning paradigm where we would like to generate a complete plan (possibly with
conditional statements and sensing actions) before starting execution. This difference
in our focus shows up in the difference in our characterization of sensing actions.
4.4.2. Goldman and Boddy’s work
In their KR-94 paper [15], Goldman and Boddy use a single model of the world
representing the planners state of the knowledge. They then first consider actions with
executability conditions (but no conditional effects) and with explicit effects that may make
fluents unknown. They define progression (the knowledge state reached after executing an
action), and regression with respect to such actions.
Next they extend their action definition to include conditional actions which have a set
of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possible outcomes (i.e., exactly one of the outcomes
will be the result of the action). They suggest that such conditional actions can be used to
describe observation operators by requiring that if such an action is supposed to observe
the fluent f , then unknown(f ) must be in the executability condition of that action.
They argue about the difficulty of adding conditional effects to their model, which does
not have representations of both the state of the world and the planner’s state of knowledge.
The following points compare and contrast their approach to that of ours:
• Since they use a single model to represent both the world and the planners knowledge
about the world, their formulation is perhaps similar to our approximations, where we
also have a single model. But, their formulation has not been shown to be sound with
respect a full formulation.
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• Their formulation of sensing actions (or observation operators as they call it) can
wrongly consider the tossing of a coin action to be a sensing action if the state of the
coin (whether ‘heads’ or ‘tails’) is unknown before the coin was tossed. Because of
this we do not believe that their formulation (restricted to a common subset with our
language) will be sound with respect to our formulation.
• They allow actions—even in the absence of conditional effects—to explicitly make
fluents unknown. We do not have such actions, but because of conditional effects, our
actions can also make fluents unknown.
In a later paper [16], they extend classical planning to allow conditional plans, context-
dependent actions, and non-deterministic outcomes and argue the necessity of separately
modeling the planner’s information state and the world state. They use propositional
dynamic logic to express conditional plans, and reason about information-gathering
(sensing) and the agent’s information state. We like their idea of using propositional
dynamic logic and results about it and appreciate their goal to explore a middle ground
between having a full formulation of sensing actions, and not allowing incompleteness at
all. That coincides with our motivation for exploring approximation. But, after carefully
reading the paper several times, we believe that more details about their formulation are
necessary to fairly and more comprehensively compare their approach to ours.
4.5. Regression
Our focus in this paper so far has been on progression and plan verification. Considering
the recent success of model-based planning using propositional satisfiability [27,29,30]
our formulation is geared towards such an approach. Nevertheless, we would like to briefly
comment on the notion of regression and its role in conditional planning with sensing
actions.
Regression with respect to simple actions has been studied in [45,48]. Scherl and
Levsque [49] study regression with respect to sensing actions. The intuition behind
regression of a formula ϕ with respect to an action a, is to find a formula ψ such that
ψ holds in a situation s if and only if ϕ will hold in the situation do(a, s). Regression can
be used to verify the correctness of a plan by regressing the goal to the initial situation
and verifying if the regressed formula holds in the initial situation. Regression can be also
used in the least commitment approach to planning [6,55]. We now present the regression
rules for regressing knowledge formulas with respect to conditional plans. The first four
rules are adapted from [49] and further simplified. The simplification is due to the use
of S5 modal logic where only one level of knowledge is sufficient. The regression over
conditional plans is our original contribution.
(1) For a fluent f and an action a with the ef-propositions a causesf if %1, . . . , a causes
f if %n, a causes ¬f if %′1, . . . , a causes ¬f if %′m
Regression(f, a)=
n∨
i=1
%i ∨
(
f ∧¬
m∧
j=1
%′j
)
.
(2) For a fluent formula ϕ and a non-sensing action a,
Regression(Knows(ϕ), a)=Knows(Regression(ϕ, a)).
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(3) For a fluent f and a sensing action a which senses the fluents f1, . . . , fn, let
I (a, f1, . . . , fn) be the set of conjunctions of literals representing the interpretations
of the set {f1, . . . , fn}. 7 Let ϕ be a fluent formula. Then,
Regression(Knows(ϕ), a)=
∧
γ∈I (a,f1,...,fn)
γ→Knows(γ→ϕ).
(4) Regression over c-formulas 8
• Regression(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, a)= Regression(ϕ1, a)∧ Regression(ϕ2, a);
• Regression(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2, a)= Regression(ϕ1, a)∨ Regression(ϕ2, a);
• Regression(¬ϕ,a)=¬Regression(ϕ, a).
(5) Regression over conditional plans and c-formulas. (In the equations below, ϕ’s are
c-formulas, and ϕi’s are fluents formulas.)
• Regression(ϕ, [])= ϕ;
• Regression(ϕ,α;a)= Regression(Regression(ϕ, a),α) where α is a sequence of
actions;
• Regression(ϕ,Case ϕ1→p1, . . . , ϕn→pn Endcase)=∨ni=1(Knows(ϕi)∧
Regression(ϕ,pi));
• Regression(ϕ, c1; c2; . . . ; cn)= Regression(Regression(ϕ, cn), c1; . . . ; cn−1)whe-
re ci ’s are conditional plans satisfying the conditions of Observation 3.1.
The next proposition proves the soundness and completeness of the regression formula.
Proposition 8. Given a domain descriptionD, let ϕ be a c-formula, and σ1, . . . , σn be the
set of grounded initial c-states of D, and c be a conditional plan that is executable in all
the grounded initial c-states of D. Then,
∀i,16 i 6 n, σi |= Regression(ϕ, c) iff ∀j,16 j 6 n, Φ̂(c, σj ) |= ϕ.
Proof. In Appendix D. 2
5. Conclusion and future work
In this paper we presented a high-level action description language that takes into
account sensing actions and distinguishes between the state of the world and the state
of the knowledge of an agent about the world. We gave sound and complete translation
of domain descriptions in our language to theories in first-order logic and have similar
translations [9,51] to disjunctive logic programming. We compared our formulation with
others and analyze the state space of our formulation and that of the others. We then gave
sound approximations of our formulation with a much smaller state space. We believe the
approximations in this paper will be very important in developing practical planners.
7 For example, if a senses f and g then I (a,f,g)= {¬f ∧¬g,¬f ∧ g,f ∧¬g,f ∧ g}.
8 A knowledge formula (k-formula) is a formula of the form Knows(ϕ), where ϕ is a fluent formula, and we
say Knows(ϕ) holds in a c-state σ = 〈s,Σ〉, if ϕ holds in all states of Σ . A combined formula (c-formula) is a
formula constructed using fluent formulas, k-formulas and the propositional connectives, and when a c-formula
holds in a c-state is defined in a straightforward way.
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Some of our future plans are:
• We would like to analyze existing planners 9 that construct conditional plans and
use sensing actions and develop more efficient planners based on the approximations
described in this paper. We have made a head start in this direction by implementing
a simple generate and test planner in Prolog.
• We would like to further explore the notions of 1-Approximation and ω-Approxima-
tion.
• We would like to follow satisfiability planning [27,29,30] and SMODELS based plan-
ning [10,12,13] by adapting our classical logic and logic programming formulations
to plan with sensing actions.
• We would like to adapt our formulation of sensing to other action description
languages—particularly the action description language for narratives [4,5]—to
develop notions of diagnosis and diagnostic and repair planning with respect to
a narrative. Intuitively, the latter means to develop a plan—possibly with sensing
actions—that leads to a unique diagnosis of a system.
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Appendix A
Proposition A.1. For every sequence of actions α of D1,
D1 6|=rAK Knows disarmed ∧¬exploded after α.
Proof. Let s1 = ∅ and s2 = {locked}. The two initial c-states of D1 are σ1 = 〈s1, {s1, s2}〉
and σ2 = 〈s2, {s1, s2}〉. Let α be an arbitrary sequence of actions of D1 and β be its
longest prefix which does not contain the action disarm. Since no action in β changes
the value of the fluent exploded, we can conclude that β is executable in σ1 and σ2. Let
Φ̂(β,σ1) = 〈s1β,Σ1β〉 and Φ̂(β,σ2) = 〈s2β,Σ2β〉. We first prove by induction over the
length of β , denoted by |β|, the following:
{s1, s2} = {s1β, s2β}, s1β ∈Σ1β and s2β ∈Σ2β. (A.1)
Base case: |β| = 0, i.e., β = []. By definition of Φ̂ , we have that Φ̂(β,σ1) = σ1 and
Φ̂(β,σ2)= σ2. Thus (A.1) holds.
Inductive step: Assume that we have proved (A.1) for |β|< n. We need to prove (A.1)
for |β| = n. Let β = β ′;a. Since a 6= disarm, a is either turn or look. If a = turn, we have
9 From the following quote in [23]: “In UWL (and in SADL) individual literals have truth values expressed in
three valued logic: T, F, U (unknown)”. it seems that they are using an approximation. We would like to analyze
this planner to figure out what kind of approximation they are using and if it is sound with respect to one of the
formulations discussed in this paper.
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that {s1β, s2β} = {Res(a, s1β ′),Res(a, s2β ′)} = {Res(a, s1),Res(a, s2)} = {s1, s2}. And, if
a = look, we have that {s1β, s2β} = {s1β ′, s2β ′ } = {s1, s2}. Furthermore, by definition of
Φ , from s1β ′ ∈ Σ1β ′ we can conclude that Res(a, s1β ′) = s1β ∈ Σ1β . Similarly, we have
s2β ∈Σ2β . The inductive hypothesis is proven.
We now use (A.1) to prove the proposition. Recall that D1 has two models (σ1,Φ) and
(σ2,Φ).
From the construction of β , there are three cases:
(1) β = α,
(2) β;disarm= α, and
(3) β;disarm is a proper prefix of α.
Case 1: β = α. Since disarmed is not true in s1 and s2, disarmed is not known to be true
in Φ̂(β,σ1) and Φ̂(β,σ2). Thus, by definition 6, D1 6|=rAK Knows disarmed after α;
Case 2: β;disarm = α. It follows from (A.1) that Res(disarm, s1) = s3 belongs to
Σ1α or Σ2α where Φ̂(β;disarm, σ1) = 〈s1α,Σ1α〉 and Φ̂(β;disarm, σ2) = 〈s2α,Σ2α〉.
Since ¬exploded does not holds in s3, we conclude that ¬exploded is not known
to be true in Φ̂(β;disarm, σ1) or Φ̂(β;disarm, σ2). Again, by Definition 6, D1 6|=rAK
Knows ¬exploded after α.
Case 3: β;disarm is a proper prefix of α. Since s1 ∈ {s1β, s2β}, either s1β = s1 or
s2β = s1. Since Res(disarm, s1)= s3 and none of the actions of D1 is executable in s3 we
can conclude that Φ̂(α,σ1)=⊥ or Φ̂(α,σ2)=⊥. This means that α is not executable in all
c-initial states of D1. By Definition 6, D1 6|=rAK Knows disarmed ∧¬exploded after α
The above three cases show that D1 6|=rAK Knows disarmed ∧¬exploded after α. This
proves the proposition. 2
Appendix B. Soundness and completeness of the translationD to R(D)
We now prove the Propositions 2 and 3. Recall that we assume that D is a domain
description with m v-propositions initiallyG1, . . . , initiallyGm and n sensing actions
K1, . . . ,Kn with the k-propositionsK1 determines F1, . . . , Kn determines Fn. And, we
also assume that for each action A, D contains at least one executability condition whose
action is A and each sensing action occurs only in one k-proposition.
In the following, we write σ.1 and σ.2 to denote the first and second component of
a c-state σ , respectively. In other words, if σ = 〈s,Σ〉, then σ.1 and σ.2 denote s and
Σ respectively. For a state s and an action sequence α = [a1; . . . ;ak], where [] denotes
the empty sequence of actions, if α is executable in s then Res(α, s) denotes the state
Res(ak,Res(ak−1, . . . ,Res(a1, s))); otherwise, Res(α, s) =⊥ (or undefined). A situation
interpretation in D is defined by a sequence of actions α followed by a state s, such that
α is executable in s, and is denoted by [α]s. For an interpretation I of the theory R(D),
we write I [[p]] to denote the set of tuples belonging to the extent of the predicate p in I .
I [[f ]](Ex) denotes the object which function f maps Ex into in I . When f is a 0-ary function
symbol, we simplify I [[f ]]() to I [[f ]].
Definition B.1. Let D be a domain description and M = (σ0,Φ) be a model of D. The
M-interpretation of R(D), denoted by MR , is defined as follows.
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The universes of MR :
(U.1) The universe of actions, denoted by |MR|action, is the set of actions A of D, i.e.,
|MR|action =A.
(U.2) The universe of fluents, denoted by |MR|fluent, is the set of fluents F of D, i.e.,
|MR|fluent = F .
(U.3) The universe of situations, denoted by |MR|situation, is defined by the set of
situation interpretations, i.e., |MR|situation= {[α]s | s ⊆ F , α is an action sequence
executable in s} ∪ {⊥} where ⊥ denotes the “impossible” situation.
The interpretations of MR:
(I.1) Fluent constants and action constants are interpreted as themselves.
(I.2) Each situation S is interpreted as a situation interpretation. In particular, MR[[S0]]
= []σ0.1.
(I.3) The interpretation of the predicate Holds is defined by 〈F, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[Holds]] iff
Res(α,S) is defined and F holds in Res(α,S).
(I.4) The interpretation of the predicate K is defined inductively as follows:
• 〈[]S′, []S〉 ∈MR[[K]] if S = σ0.1 and S′ ∈ σ0.2; and
• 〈[α;A]S′, [α;A]S〉 ∈MR[[K]] if the following conditions are satisfied
– 〈[α]S′, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[K]];
– A is executable in Res(α,S) and Res(α,S′); and
– either A is a non-sensing action or A is a sensing action that senses the fluent
F and Res(α,S) and Res(α,S′) agree on F .
• 〈[α′]S′, [α]S〉 /∈MR[[K]] otherwise.
(I.5) The interpretation of the function do is defined by MR[[do]](A, [α]S)= [α;A]S if
A is executable in Res(α,S); otherwise MR[[do]](A, [α]S)=⊥.
The interpretation MR is then extended to the predicates introduced in Section 2.3 such
as γ+F , γ
−
F , Poss, etc. For example, for a situation interpretation [α]S,• 〈ϕ, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[Holds]] iff ϕ holds in Res(α,S); or
• 〈A, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[γ+F ]] iff there exists an ef-proposition “A causes F if ρ” ∈D such
that 〈ρ, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[Holds]]; or
• 〈A, [α]S〉 ∈ MR[[Poss]] iff there exists an ex-proposition “executable A if ρ” ∈ D
such that 〈ρ, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[Holds]];
• etc.
We next prove some lemmas about the relationship between a modelM ofD and theM-
interpretationMR which will be used in proving the Propositions 2 and 3. For convenience,
for a formula ϕ in the language of R(D), if ϕ is true in MR we write MR |= ϕ.
Lemma B.1. For each model M = (σ0,Φ) of a domain description D, a fluent F , an
action A, and a situation interpretation [α]S
(i) 〈A, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[γ+F ]] iff F ∈E+A (Res(α,S)); and
(ii) 〈A, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[γ−F ]] iff F ∈E−A (Res(α,S)).
Proof. [α]S is a situation interpretation implies that α is executable in S. Therefore,
Res(α,S) is defined. We have that
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〈A, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[γ+F ]]
iff there exists an ef-proposition “A causes F if %” ∈D
such that 〈%, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[Holds]] (Definition of γ+F )
iff there exists an ef-proposition “A causes F if %” ∈D
such that % holds in Res(α,S) (by item (I.3) of Definition B.1)
iff F ∈E+A(Res(α,S)).
Thus (i) is proved.
Similarly, we can prove (ii). 2
Lemma B.2. For each model M = (σ0,Φ) of a domain description D, an action A, and
a situation interpretation [α]S,
(i) 〈A, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[Poss]] iff A is executable in Res(α,S); and
(ii) if 〈A, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[Poss]] then MR[[do]](A, [α]S)= [α;A]S.
Proof. Again, since [α]S is a situation interpretation, we have that α is executable in S.
Thus Res(α,S) is defined. From the definition of Poss, we have that
〈A, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[Poss]]
iff there exists an ex-proposition “executable A if ρ” ∈D
such that 〈ρ, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[Holds]]
iff there exists an ex-proposition “executable A if ρ” ∈D
such that ρ holds in Res(α,S) (by item (I.3) of Definition B.1)
iff A is executable in Res(α,S). (1)
The second item follows immediately from (1) and item (I.5) of Definition B.1. 2
Lemma B.3. For each model M = (σ0,Φ) of a domain description D, MR satisfies
axiom (2.8).
Proof. Consider an action A, a situation S, and a positive fluent literal F . Let MR[[S]] =
[α]S. The axiom (2.8) is true in MR if 〈A, [α]S〉 /∈MR[[Poss]]. Thus we need to prove that
it is also true in MR when 〈A, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[Poss]].
From 〈A, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[Poss]] and Lemma B.2, we have thatA is executable in Res(α,S).
Hence, by (I.5) of Definition B.1,
MR[[do]](A, [α]S)= [α;A]S. (1)
We have that
MR |=Holds(F,do(A,S))
iff 〈F,MR[[do]](A, [α]S)〉 ∈MR[[Holds]]
iff 〈F, [α;A]S〉 ∈MR[[Holds]] because MR[[do]](A, [α]S)= [α;A]S, by (1)
iff F holds in Res([α;A], S) (by item (I.3) of Definition B.1)
iff F ∈ Res(A,Res(α,S))
iff F ∈E+A(Res(α,S))
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or F ∈ Res(α,S)∧ F /∈E−A(Res(α,S)) (by definition of Res)
iff 〈A, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[γ+F ]] (by Lemma B.1)
or (〈F, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[Holds]] ∧ 〈A, [α]S〉 /∈MR[[γ−F ]]) (by Lemma B.1 and (I.3)
of Definition B.1)
iff MR |= γ+F (A,S)∨ (Holds(F,S)∧¬γ−F (A,S)) (2)
Similarly, we can prove (2) for negative fluent literal. Thus MR satisfies (2.8). 2
Lemma B.4. For each model M = (σ0,Φ) of a domain description D, MR satisfies the
axioms (2.10)–(2.12).
Proof. Consider a situation S1 such that MR |=K(S1,S0).
This means that 〈MR[[S1]],MR[[S0]]〉 ∈MR[[K]]. Hence, by item (I.4) of Definition B.1
and from the fact that MR[[S0]] = []σ0.1, we can conclude that MR[[S1]] = []S for some
S ∈ σ0.2. Since M is a model of D, S is an initial state of D. Therefore, Gi holds in S
for every i = 1, . . . ,m. Because [] is executable in S, by item (I.3) of Definition B.1, we
conclude that 〈∧mi=1Gi, []S〉 ∈MR[[Holds]], i.e., MR |=∧mi=1 Holds(Gi,S1). Since this
holds for every S1 such that MR |=K(S1,S0), we can conclude that
MR satisfies (2.11). (1)
SinceM is a model ofD, we have that σ0.1 ∈ σ0.2. Thus, by item (I.4) of Definition B.1,
we have that MR |=K(S0,S0). Hence,
MR satisfies (2.12). (2)
Since σ0.1 is also an initial state of D, from (1) and (2), we can conclude that
MR satisfies (2.10). (3)
The lemma follows from (1)–(3). 2
Lemma B.5. For each model M = (σ0,Φ) of a domain description D, MR satisfies
axiom (2.9).
Proof. Consider an actionA and a situation S. LetMR[[S]] = [α]S. Similar to Lemma B.3,
it suffices to prove that MR satisfies axiom (2.9) when 〈A, [α]S〉 ∈ MR[[Poss]]. By
Lemma B.2, this implies that
Res(α,S) is defined, A is executable in Res(α,S), and
MR[[do]](A, [α]S)= [α;A]S. (1)
There are two cases:
Case 1: MR |=K(S2,do(A,S)) for some situation S2. Let MR[[S2]] = [α2]S2. We will
prove that the following formula is also true in MR :
∃s1.
[
(K(s1,S)∧ Poss(A, s1)∧ S2 = do(A, s1))∧((
n∧
i=1
A 6=Ki
)
∨
n∨
i=1
(A=Ki ∧Holds(Fi, s1))≡Holds(Fi,S)
)]
. (B.2)
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MR |= K(S2,do(A,S)) implies that 〈[α2]S2,MR[[do]](A, [α]S)〉 ∈MR[[K]], and hence,
〈[α2]S2, [α;A]S〉 ∈MR[[K]]. By item (I.4) of Definition B.1 we have that α2 = α;A, and
〈[α]S2, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[K]]; (2)
A is executable in Res(α,S2) and Res(α,S); (3)
A is a non-sensing action or if A is sensing action, say Ki,
then Res(α,S2) and Res(α,S) agree on Fi; (4)
Let S1 be a situation such that MR[[S1]] = [α]S2. It follows from (3) and Lemma B.2
that 〈A, [α]S2〉 ∈MR[[Poss]]. Furthermore, from (3) and (4), we can conclude that
MR |=
((
n∧
i=1
A 6=Ki
)
∨
n∨
i=1
(A=Ki ∧Holds(Fi,S2))≡ Holds(Fi,S)
)
.
Together with (2), we have that S1 satisfies (B.2).
Case 2: Assume that the formula (B.2) is true for some S1 with MR[[S1]] = [α1]S1. We
want to show that
MR |=K(S2,do(A,S)) (B.6)
where S2 = do(A,S1). Similar to the above case, fromMR |=K(S1,S) and 〈A, [α1]S1〉 ∈
MR[[Poss]], we can conclude that α1 = α, and A is executable in Res(α,S1). Thus,
MR[[do]](A, [α]S1)= [α;A]S1. (5)
It follows from (B.2) that MR |= ((∧ni=1A 6= Ki) ∨∨ni=1(A = Ki ∧ Holds(Fi,S1) ≡
Holds(Fi,S)). This implies that
either A is a non-sensing action or A is a sensing action,
say Ki, and Res(α,S1) and Res(α,S) agree on Fi. (6)
It follows from (1) and (5)–(6) and (I.4) of Definition B.1 that 〈[α;A]S1, [α;A]S〉 ∈
MR[[K]]. This, together with (1) and (5), implies that 〈MR[[do]](A, [α]S1),MR[[do]](A,
[α]S)〉 ∈MR[[K]] which proves that (B.6) is true in MR .
It follows from the above two cases that MR satisfies (2.9). 2
Lemma B.6. For each model M = (σ0,Φ) of a domain description D, the M-interpreta-
tion of R(D), MR , is a model of R(D).
Proof. It follows from Lemmas B.3–B.5 that MR satisfies the axioms (2.8)–(2.12). It is
easy to see that the closure assumptions and unique name assumptions for fluents and
actions are satisfied by MR too. Thus, MR is a model of R(D). 2
Lemma B.7. For each situation interpretation [α]S, the following statements are
equivalent:
(i) 〈[α]S, [α]σ0.1〉 ∈MR[[K]]; and
(ii) α is executable in S and σ0.1, and Res(γ, S) ∈ Φ̂(γ, σ0).2 for every prefix γ of α.
Proof. Induction over |α|.
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Base case: |α| = 0, i.e., α = []. By item (I.4) of Definition B.1, 〈[]S, []σ0.1〉 ∈MR[[K]]
iff S ∈ σ0.2 = Φ̂(α,σ0).2. Together with the fact that [] is executable in S and σ0.1, we
conclude the base case.
Inductive step: Assume that we have proved the lemma for |α|< k. We need to show it
for |α| = k. Let α = [β;A]. Then, |β|< k. We consider two cases:
(i) ⇒ (ii) From item (I.4) of Definition B.1 and (i) for α = [β;A], we have that
〈[β]S, [β]σ0.1〉 ∈MR[[K]]; (1)
A is executable in Res(β,S) and Res(β,σ0.1); and (2)
if A senses Fj then Res(β,S) and Res(β,σ0.1) agree on Fj . (3)
By inductive hypothesis, from (1), we conclude that
β is executable in S and σ0.1, and Res(γ, S) ∈ Φ̂(γ, σ0).2 for every prefix γ of β.
(4)
From (2) and the fact that β is executable in S and σ0.1, we have that
[β;A] is executable in S and σ0.1. (5)
From (3) and the fact that Res(β,S) ∈ Φ̂(β,σ0).2, we conclude that
Res([β;A], S)∈ Φ̂([β;A], σ0).2. (6)
The inductive step for this direction follows from (4)–(6).
(ii) ⇒ (i) α is executable in S and σ0.1 implies that β is executable in S and σ0.1.
Furthermore, every prefix of β is a prefix of α. Hence, by inductive hypothesis, we have
that
〈[β]S, [β]σ0.1〉 ∈MR[[K]]. (7)
α is executable in S and σ0.1 also implies that
A is executable in Res(β,S) and Res(β,σ0.1). (8)
Res(β,S) ∈ Φ̂(β,σ0).2 and Res([β;A], S)∈ Φ̂([β;A], σ0).2 implies that
if A is a sensing action, say Ki,
then Res(β,S) and Res(β,σ0.1) must agree on Fi. (9)
It follows from (7)–(9) and item (I.4) of Definition B.1 that 〈[β;A]s, [β;A]σ0.1〉 ∈
MR[[K]]. This concludes the inductive step for this direction.
The inductive step is proved. Hence, by mathematical induction, we conclude the
lemma. 2
Lemma B.8. For every state S and action sequence α, α is executable in S iff 〈α, []S〉 ∈
MR[[Poss]].
Proof. By induction over |α|.
Base case: α = []. The lemma is trivial because [] is executable in every state S and
〈[], []S〉 ∈MR[[Poss]] for every state S.
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Inductive step: Assume that we have proved the lemma for |α|< k. We need to show it
for |α| = k. Let α = [β;A]. We have that |β|< k and
β;A is executable in S
iff β is executable in S and A is executable in Res(β,S)
iff 〈β, []S〉 ∈MR[[Poss]] (by inductive hypothesis)
and 〈A,MR[[do]](β, []S)〉 ∈MR[[Poss]] (by Lemma B.2)
iff 〈[β;A], []S〉 ∈MR[[Poss]]. 2
Lemma B.9. Let D be a domain description and M = (σ0,Φ) be a model of D. Then,
there exists a model MR of R(D) such that for any fluent formula ϕ and sequence
of actions α of D, α is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(α,σ0) iff
MR |= Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0))∧ Poss(α,S0).
Proof. Let MR be the M-interpretation of R(D). By Lemma B.6 we have that MR is a
model of R(D). We will prove that MR satisfies the conclusion of the lemma.
We have that
α is executable in σ0
iff α is executable in σ0.1
iff 〈α, []σ0.1〉 ∈MR[[Poss]] (by Lemma B.8)
iff MR |= Poss(α,S0). (1)
ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(α,σ0)
iff for every S ∈ Φ̂(α,σ0).2, ϕ holds in S (by definition)
iff for every S ∈ σ0.2 such that
α is executable in S and Res(γ, S) ∈ Φ̂(γ, σ0).2
for every prefix γ of α,ϕ holds in Res(α,S)
iff for every [α]S such that 〈[α]S, [α]σ0.1〉 ∈MR[[K]] (by Lemma B.7)
and 〈ϕ, [α]S〉 ∈MR[[Holds]] (by item (I.3) of Definition B.1)
iff MR |= Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0)) (by definition of Knows) (2)
The lemma follows from (1) and (2). 2
We now prove the counterpart of Lemma B.9. Let D be a domain description and MR
be a model of R(D). Since R(D) contains the DCA and UNA axioms for actions and
fluents we can assume that the domains of actions and fluents are A and F respectively,
i.e., |MR|action =A and |MR|fluent = F . In what follows, whenever we say a situation S we
mean a ground situation term. We define
Definition B.2. Let D be a domain description and MR be a model of R(D). For each
ground situation term s in MR , let s∗ = {F | Holds(F, s) is true in MR, F is a positive
fluent literal}. 10 The MR-initial c-state of D, denoted by σ ∗0 , is defined as follows.
(M.1) σ ∗0 .1= S∗0;
(M.2) σ ∗0 .2= {s∗ |K(s,S0) is true in MR}.
10 Recall that Holds(¬F, s) stands for ¬Holds(F, s).
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We call M = (σ ∗0 ,Φ), where σ ∗0 is the MR-initial c-state and Φ is the transition function
of D (defined in Definition 2), the MR-based model of D.
Lemma B.10. For a domain description D and a model MR of R(D), the MR-based
model of D. is a model of D.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary v-proposition “initiallyGi” of D. There are two cases:
• Gi is a positive literal. Since MR is a model of R(D), from (2.10) we have that
Holds(Gi,S0) is true in MR . By (M.1) of Definition B.2, we have that
Gi ∈ σ ∗0 .1, i.e., Gi holds in σ ∗0 .1. (1)
• Gi is a negative literal, say Gi = ¬G. Again, since MR is a model of R(D),
from (2.10) we have that Holds(¬G,S0) is true in MR , or Holds(G,S0) is false in
MR . Thus, by (M.1) of Definition B.2, we have that
G /∈ σ ∗0 .1, i.e.,Gi holds in σ ∗0 .1. (2)
It follows from (1) and (2) that
σ ∗0 .1 is an initial state of D. (3)
Consider S ∈ σ ∗0 .2. By (M.2) of Definition B.2, we conclude that there exists S such that
S = S∗ and K(S,S0) is true in MR . Hence, by axiom (2.11),∧mi=1 Holds(Gi,S) is true in
MR . Similar to (1) and (2) we can prove that
S is an initial state of D. (4)
From (3) and (4) we have that σ ∗0 is an initial c-state. Furthermore, axiom (2.12)
and (M.2) of Definition B.2 indicate that σ ∗0 .1 ∈ σ ∗0 .2, i.e., σ ∗0 is a grounded initial c-state.
Since Φ is the transition function of D and σ ∗0 is an initial ground c-state, M = (σ ∗0 ,Φ) is
a model of D. 2
The next corollary follows immediately from Definition B.2.
Corollary B.1. For each model MR of R(D), a fluent formula ϕ, and a situation S,
Holds(ϕ,S) holds in MR iff ϕ holds in S∗.
Lemma B.11. For each model MR of R(D), a fluent F , a situation S, and an action A
(i) γ+F (A,S) is true in MR iff F ∈E+A(S∗); and
(ii) γ−F (A,S) is true in MR iff F ∈E−A(S∗).
Proof. We have that
γ+F (A,S) is true in MR
iff
∨
“A causes F if %”∈DHolds(%,S) is true in MR (Definition of γ+F (A,S))
iff there exists an ef-proposition “A causes F if %” ∈D
such that % holds in S∗ (by Corollary B.1)
iff F ∈E+A(S∗).
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Thus (i) is proved.
Similarly, we can prove (ii). 2
Lemma B.12. For each model MR of R(D), a situation S, and an action A,
(i) Poss(A,S) is true in MR iff A is executable in S∗; and
(ii) if Poss(A,S) is true in MR then (S′)∗ = Res(A,S∗) where S′ = do(A,S).
Proof.
Poss(A,S) is true in MR
iff there exists an ex-proposition “executable A if ρ” ∈D
such that Holds(ρ,S) is true in MR
iff there exists an ex-proposition “executable A if ρ” ∈D
such that ρ holds in S∗
iff A is executable in S∗. (1)
We have that if Poss(A,S) is true in MR then, for a fluent F ,
F ∈ (S′)∗
iff Holds(F,do(A,S)) is true in MR
iff γ+F (A,S)∨ (Holds(F,S)∧¬γ−F (A,S)) is true in MR (by axiom (2.8))
iff F ∈E+A(S∗) or (F ∈ S∗ and F /∈E−A(S∗)) (by Lemma B.11)
F ∈ Res(A,S∗). (2)
The lemma follows from (1) and (2). 2
Lemma B.13. For each model MR of R(D), a situation S, and a sequence of actions α:
(i) Poss(α,S) is true in MR iff α is executable in S∗; and
(ii) if Poss(α,S) is true in MR then [do(α,S)]∗ = Res(α,S∗).
Proof. By induction over |α|.
Base case: |α| = 0. (i) is trivial because Poss([],S) is true (by definition) and [] is
executable in every state. (ii) follows immediately from (M.1) of Definition B.2. The case
|α| = 1 is proven by Lemma B.12.
Inductive step: Assume that we have proved the lemma for |α|< k. We need to show it
for |α| = k. Let α = [β;A]. We have that |β|< k. We have that
Poss(α,S) is true in MR
iff Poss(β,S) is true in MR and Poss(A,do(β,S)) is true in MR (by definition)
iff Poss(β,S) is true in MR and
there exists an ex-proposition “executable A if ρ” ∈D
such that Holds(ρ,do(β,S)) is true in MR
iff β is executable in S∗ (by inductive hypothesis, item (i))
and there exists an ex-proposition “executable A if ρ” ∈D
such that ρ holds in Res(β,S∗) (by inductive hypothesis, item (ii))
[β;A] is executable in S∗. (1)
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Let S′ = do(β,S). By Lemma B.12, we have that [do(A,S′)]∗ = Res(A, (S′)∗). By
inductive hypothesis, we have that (S′)∗ = Res(β,S∗). Hence,
[do([β;A],S)]∗ = [do(A,do(β,S))]∗ = Res(A, (S′)∗)
= Res(A,Res(β,S∗))= Res([β;A],S∗). (2)
The inductive step follows from (1) and (2). 2
Lemma B.14. Let D be a domain description and MR be a model of R(D). Then, there
exists a model (σ0,Φ) of D such that for any fluent formula ϕ and sequence of actions α
of D, MR |= Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0)) ∧ Poss(α,S0) iff α is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known
to be true in Φ̂(α,σ0).
Proof. We will prove that the MR-based model of D, M = (σ ∗0 ,Φ), satisfies the
conclusion of the lemma. By Lemma B.10, M is a model of D. By Lemma B.13, we
have that
Poss(α,S0) is true in MR
iff α is executable in (S0)∗ = σ ∗0 .1
iff α is executable in σ ∗0 . (1)
We now prove by induction over the length of α that M satisfies the lemma and the
following properties.
(i) K(s,do(α,S0)) is true in MR iff s∗ ∈ Φ̂(α,σ ∗0 ).2.
Base case: |α| = 0. The conclusion of the lemma is trivial because of the definition of
M . (i) is equivalent to
K(s,S0) is true in MR iff s∗ ∈ σ ∗0 .2
which follows immediately from item (M.2) of Definition B.2 and the fact that K(S0,S0)
is true in MR . This proves the base case.
Inductive step: Assume that we have proved the lemma for |α|< l. We need to prove it
for |α| = l. Let α = [β;A].
It follows from the construction of R(D) that
K(s,do([β;A],S0)) is true in MR
iff ∃s1.[(K(s1,do(β,S0))∧ Poss(A, s1)∧ s= do(A, s1)
and (
∧n
j=1(A 6=Kj )∧∨n
j=1(A=Kj ∧
(Holds(Fj , s1)≡Holds(Fj ,do(β,S0)))))]
is true in MR (by (2.9))
iff s∗1 ∈ Φ̂(β,σ ∗0 ).2 (by inductive hypothesis)
and s∗ = Res(A, s∗1) (by s= do(A, s1) and (M.1) of Definition B.2)
and if Al =Kj then Fj ∈ s∗1 iff Fj ∈ Φ̂(β,σ ∗0 ).1
iff s∗ ∈ Φ̂(β,σ ∗0 ).2 (2)
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Consider a fluent formula ϕ, we have that
MR |= Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0))∧ Poss(α,S0)
iff Poss(α,S0) is true in MR and
∀s.[K(s,do(α,S0))⊃Holds(F, s)] is true in MR
iff α is executable in σ ∗0
and ∀s∗ ∈ Φ̂(α,σ ∗0 ).2, ϕ holds in s∗ (by (1) and (i))
iff α is executable in σ ∗0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(α,σ ∗0 ). (3)
(2) and (3) prove the inductive step for (i) and the lemma’s conclusion. The lemma is
proved. 2
We now prove Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. LetD be a domain description, ϕ be a fluent formula, and α be a sequence
of actions of D. Then,
D |=AK Knows ϕ after α iff R(D) |= Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0))∧ Poss(α,S0).
Proof. (a) Assume that D |=AK Knows ϕ after α. We will prove that R(D) |=
Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0))∧Poss(α,S0). Assume the contrary,R(D) 6|= Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0))∧
Poss(α,S0). By definition, there exists a model MR of R(D) such that MR 6|= Knows(ϕ,
do(α,S0)) orMR 6|= Poss(α,S0). Then, by Lemma B.14, there exists a modelM ofD such
thatM 6|=Knows ϕ after α. This implies that D 6|=AK Knows ϕ after α which contradicts
with the assumption that D |=AK Knows ϕ after α. Hence, our assumption is incorrect,
i.e., we have proved that R(D) |= Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0)) ∧ Poss(α,S0). Therefore, we can
conclude that
if D |=AK Knows ϕ after α then R(D) |= Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0))∧ Poss(α,S0). (1)
(b) Assume that R(D) |= Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0)) ∧ Poss(α,S0). We will prove that
D |=AK Knows ϕ after α. Assume the contrary, D 6|=AK Knows ϕ after α. This means
that there exists a model M of D such that M 6|=Knows ϕ after α. Then, by Lemma B.9,
there exists a model MR of R(D) such that MR 6|= Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0)) ∧ Poss(α,S0).
This implies that R(D) 6|= Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0)) ∧ Poss(α,S0) which contradicts our
assumption. Hence, we have that D |=AK Knows ϕ after α. So,
if R(D) |= Knows(ϕ,do(α,S0))∧ Poss(α,S0) thenD |=AK Knows ϕ after α. (2)
From (1) and (2), we can conclude that
D |=AK Knows ϕ after α iff R(D) |= Knows(F,do(α,S0))∧ Poss(α,S0). 2
We will now extend the Lemmas B.9 and B.14 to conditional plans. We need the
following notation and lemmas.
Let c be a conditional plan, we define the number of case plans of c, denoted by count(c),
inductively as follows.
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(1) If c= [], then count(c)= 0.
(2) If c= a, a is an action, then count(c)= 0.
(3) If c1 and c2 are conditional plans, then case(c1; c2)= count(c1)+ count(c2).
(4) If c is a case plan of the form
Case
ϕ1→ c1
. . .
ϕn→ cn
Endcase
then count(c)= 1+∑ni=1 count(ci).
It follows directly from the definition of BApply the following lemma.
Lemma B.15. Let s, s′ be situations and c be a conditional plan. The following formulas
are entailed by BApply:
(i) Apply([], s, s′)⊃ s= s′;
(ii) Apply([case([])|c], s, s′)⊃ s′ =⊥; and
(iii) Apply(c,⊥, s′)⊃ s′ =⊥.
Proof. Assume that (i) is not entailed by BApply. Then, there exists a model M of BApply
such that Apply([], s, s′) is true in M but s 6= s′. It is easy to see that M \ Apply([], s, s′) is
also model of BApply. This violates the minimality ofM . Thus, (i) is true in every model of
BApply. Similarly, we can prove (ii) and (iii). 2
Lemma B.16. Let s, s′, s′′ be situations, a be an action, ϕ be a fluent formula, α be a
sequence of actions, and c, c′, c′′ be conditional plans. The following formulas are entailed
by BApply:
(i) Apply([a|α], s, s′)∧ s 6=⊥⊃
((Poss(a, s)⊃ Apply(α,do(a, s), s′))∧ (¬Poss(a, s)⊃ s′ =⊥));
(ii) Apply([case([(ϕ, c)|r ′])|c′′], s, s′)∧ s 6=⊥⊃
((knows(ϕ, s)⊃ ∃s′′.Apply(c, s, s′′)∧ Apply(c′′, s′′, s′))∧
(¬knows(ϕ, s)⊃ Apply([case(r ′)|c′′], s, s′))); and
(iii) Apply(c, s, s′)∧ Apply(c, s, s′′)⊃ s′ = s′′.
Proof. Assume that (i) is not entailed by BApply. It means that there exists a model M
of BApply, an action a, a sequence of actions α, and two situations s and s′ such that
Apply([a|α], s, s′) ∧ s 6=⊥ is true in M and (Poss(a, s) ⊃ Apply([a|α],do(a, s), s′)) ∧
(¬Poss(a, s) ⊃ s′ =⊥) is not true in M . By definition of BApply, the model M ′ =
M \ {Apply([a|α], s, s′)} is a model of BApply. This contradicts the assumption that M
is a minimal model of BApply. Hence, our assumption that (i) is not true in M is incorrect,
i.e., we have proved that (i) is a valid sentence of BApply.
Similarly, we can prove item (ii). The proof of item (iii) is based on induction over
count(c) and is omitted here. 2
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Lemma B.17. Let c1, . . . , cn be n arbitrary conditional plans, (n> 1). Then, the following
formula is entailed by BApply:
Apply([c1; . . . ; cn], s1, sn+1)≡
∃(s2, . . . , sn).[Apply(c1, s1, s2)∧ · · · ∧ Apply(cn, sn, sn+1)].
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction over n.
Base case: n = 1. Then, we have that the right hand side is ∃s2.Apply(c1, s1, s2) and
the left hand side is Apply(c1, s1, s2). It follows from item (iii) of Lemma B.16 that
Apply(c1, s1, s2)≡ ∃(s2).Apply(c1, s1, s2). This proves the base case.
Inductive step: Assume that we have proved the lemma for n. We need to prove it for
n+1. Since cn and cn+1 are conditional plans, by definition, we have that c= cn; cn+1 is a
conditional plan. Hence, by inductive hypothesis for n plans c1, . . . , cn−1, c, we have that
Apply([c1; . . . ; cn−1; c], s1, sn+2)≡
∃(s2, . . . , sn).[Apply(c1, s1, s2)∧ · · · ∧ Apply(c, sn, sn+2)]. (1)
By inductive hypothesis for 2 plans cn and cn+1, we have that
Apply(c, sn, sn+2)≡ ∃(sn+1).[Apply(cn, sn, sn+1)∧ Apply(cn+1, sn+1, sn+2)]. (2)
The inductive step follows from (1) and (2). I.e., the lemma is proved. 2
Lemma B.18. Let c be a case plan of the form
Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
and s 6=⊥. Then, the following formula is entailed by BApply:
Knows(ϕj , s)∧ Apply(c, s, s′)≡ Knows(ϕj , s)∧ Apply(pj , s, s′).
Proof. LetM be a model of BApply. Obviously, if Knows(ϕj , s) is false inM for 16 j 6 l,
the formula is true inM . So, we need to prove it for the case there exists some j , 16 j 6 l,
Knows(ϕj , s) is true in M . We consider two cases:
(a) Left to Right: Assume that Knows(ϕj , s) ∧ Apply(c, s, s′) is true in M . Then,
since ϕj ’s are mutual exclusive, we can conclude that ¬Knows(ϕi, s) is true in M , for
i 6= j, 16 i 6 l. Hence, by item (ii) of Lemma B.16 (for c′′ = [], ϕ = ϕj , c= pj ) we have
that
∃s′′.Apply(pj , s, s′′)∧ Apply([], s′′, s′) is true in M. (1)
From item (i) of Lemma B.15, we have that s′′ = s′. Hence, (1) is equivalent to,
Apply(pj , s, s′) is true in M. (2)
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It follows from the assumption that Knows(ϕj , s) is true in M and (2) that Knows(ϕj , s)∧
Apply(pj , s, s′) is true in M , which proves (a).
(b) Right to Left: Assume that Knows(ϕj , s) ∧ Apply(pj , s, s′) holds in M . Similar
argument as above concludes that ¬Knows(ϕi, s) is true in M , for i 6= j, 1 6 i 6 l.
Hence, by definition of Apply (case 6, for c′′ = [], r ′ is the sequence [(ϕ1,p1), . . . ,
(ϕj−1,pj−1), (ϕj+1,pj+1), . . . , (ϕl,pl)]), we have that
Knows(ϕj , s)∧ Apply(pj , s, s′)∧ Apply([], s′, s′′)⊃
Apply([case([(ϕj ,pj )|r ′], s, s′′) holds in M.
Furthermore, from (i) of Lemma B.15, we have that s′′ = s′. Hence, we conclude that
Apply(c, s, s′)∧Knows(ϕj , s) holds in M . This proves (b).
The lemma follows from (a) and (b). 2
Lemma B.19. Assume that c = c1, . . . , cn is a conditional plan where c1, . . . , cn is a
sequence of conditional plans satisfying the conditions of Observation 3.1. Let c1 be a
case plan of the form
Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
and s be a situation term. Let M be a model of BApply such that M |= Knows(ϕj , s)
for some j , 1 6 j 6 l. Then, M ∪ BApply |= Apply(c, s, s′) ≡ Apply(c′, s, s′) where c′ =
pj ; c2; . . . ; cn.
Proof. By Lemma B.17, there exists s1, . . . , sn−1 such that
Apply(c, s, s′)≡ Apply(c1, s, s1)∧ · · · ∧ Apply(cn, sn−1, s′)
is true in M ∪BApply. (1)
Since M |= Knows(ϕj , s), by Lemma B.18 and from (1), we have that
Knows(ϕj , s)∧ Apply(c1, s, s1)≡ Knows(ϕj , s)∧ Apply(pj , s, s1)
is true in M ∪BApply. (2)
It follows from (1) and (2) that
M ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕj , s)∧ Apply(c, s, s′)≡
Knows(ϕj , s)∧ Apply(pj , s, s1)∧ Apply(c2, s1, s3)∧ · · · ∧ Apply(cn, sn−1, s′),
which implies that
M ∪BApply |= Apply(c, s, s′)≡ Apply(c′, s, s′). (by Lemma B.17) (3)
The lemma follows from (3). 2
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Lemma B.20. Assume that c = c1, . . . , cn is a conditional plan where c1, . . . , cn is a
sequence of conditional plans satisfying the conditions of Observation 3.1. Let c1 be a
sequence of actions and c2 be a case plan of the form
Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
and s be a situation term. LetM be a model of BApply such thatM |= Knows(ϕj ,do(c1, s))
for some j , 1 6 j 6 l. Then, M ∪ BApply |= Apply(c, s, s′) ≡ Apply(c′, s, s′) where c′ =
c1;pj ; . . . ; cn.
Proof. Since M |= Knows(ϕj ,do(c1, s)), we conclude that Poss(c1, s) is true in M . By
Lemma B.17, there exists s1, . . . , sn−1 such that Apply(c, s, s′)≡ Apply(c1, s, s1) ∧ · · · ∧
Apply(cn, sn−1, s′) holds in M ∪BApply. (1)
Since c1 is a sequence of actions, we have that s1 = do(c1, s). Therefore, from M |=
Knows(ϕj ,do(c1, s)), s1 = do(c1, s), and by Lemma B.18, we have that
M ∪BApply |= Apply(c2, s1, s2)≡ Apply(pj , s1, s2). (2)
It follows from (1) and (2) that
M ∪BApply |= Apply(c, s, s′)≡ Apply(c1, s, s1)∧ Apply(pj , s1, s2)∧
Apply(c3, s2, s3)∧ · · · ∧ Apply(cn, sn−1, s′),
which implies that
M ∪BApply |= Apply(c, s, s′)≡ Apply(c′, s, s′). (by Lemma B.17) (3)
The lemma follows from (3). 2
Lemma B.21. Let D be a domain description and M = (σ0,Φ) be a model of D. Then,
there exists a modelMR of R(D) such that for any fluent formula ϕ and conditional plan c,
• c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0) iff MR ∪ BApply |=
Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥;
• Φ̂(c, σ0)=⊥ iff MR ∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0, ⊥).
Proof. From Observation 3.1, we can assume that c = c1; . . . ; cn where ci is a sequence
of actions or a case plan and for every i , 16 i 6 n− 1, if ci is a sequence of actions then
ci+1 is a case plan.
Let MR be the M-interpretation of D. By Lemma B.2, MR is model of R(D). We will
prove by induction over count(c) that MR satisfies the lemma.
Base case: count(c)= 0. Using items (i) and (iii) of Lemma B.16, we can prove that
MR ∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0, s)⊃
(Poss(c,S0)⊃ s= do(c,S0))∧ (¬Poss(c,S0)⊃ s=⊥). (1)
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By Lemma B.9, we have that c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0)
iff
MR |= Knows(ϕ,do(c,S0))∧ Poss(c,S0). (2)
It follows from (1) and (2) that c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0)
iff
MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥ . (3)
(3) proves the first item of the lemma. To complete the base case, we need to prove the
second item. Since c is a sequence of actions, we have that
Φ̂(c, σ0)=⊥
iff c is not executable in σ0
iff MR |= ¬Poss(c,S0) (Lemma B.9)
iff MR ∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0,⊥) (by (1)).
So, the second item of the lemma is proved. The base case is proved.
Inductive step: Assume that we have proved the lemma for count(c) 6 k. We need to
prove the lemma for count(c)= k + 1.
Case 1: c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0). We will show that
Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥ is true in MR ∪BApply.
We consider two cases:
Case 1.1: c1 is a case plan. Assume that c1 is the following case plan
Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
Since c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0)we have that⊥ 6= Φ̂(c, σ0).
It implies that
there exists j, 16 j 6 l, such that ϕj is known to be true in σ0. (4)
Let c′ = pj ; c2; . . . ; cn. Then, by definition of Φ̂ and from (4) we have that Φ̂(c, σ0)=
Φ̂(c′, σ0). Hence, ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c′, σ0). Since count(c′)6 count(c)− 1, we
have that count(c′)6 k. Thus, by inductive hypothesis, we can conclude that
Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c′,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥ is true in MR ∪BApply. (5)
It follows from Lemma B.19 that
MR ∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0, s)≡ Apply(c′,S0, s). (6)
From (5) and (6) we have that MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥.
Case 1.2: c1 is a sequence of actions. Then, c2 is a case plan. Let us assume that c2 is
the case plan.
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Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
Since c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0) we have that ⊥ 6=
Φ̂(c, σ0). This implies that
there exists j, 16 j 6 l, such that ϕj is known to be true in Φ̂(c1, σ0). (7)
Let c′ = c1;pj ; c3; . . . ; cn. From (7) and the definition of Φ̂ , we have that Φ̂(c, σ0) =
Φ̂(c′, σ0). This implies that
ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c′, σ0). (8)
Since count(c′)6 count(c)− 1, we have that count(c′)6 k. Thus, by inductive hypothesis
and (8), we conclude that
MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c′,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥ . (9)
From Lemma B.20, we have that
MR ∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0, s)≡ Apply(c′,S0, s). (10)
(9) and (10) prove that MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥.
The above two cases prove that if c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in
Φ̂(c, σ0) then MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥.
Case 2: MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥. We will prove that c is
executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0). We consider two cases:
Case 2.1: c1 is a case plan. Assume that c1 is the following case plan
Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
SinceMR∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0, s)∧s 6=⊥, by items (ii) of Lemma B.16, we conclude
that
there exists j, 16 j 6 l, such that MR |= Knows(ϕj ,S0). (11)
Let c′ = pj ; c2; . . . ; cn. By Lemma B.19 we have that MR ∪ BApply |= Apply(c,S0, s) ≡
Apply(c′,S0, s). This implies that
MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c′,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥ . (12)
Furthermore, from the definition of MR and (11), we have that ϕj is known to be true in
σ0. This implies that
Φ̂(c, σ0)= Φ̂(c′, σ0). (13)
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Since count(c′)6 count(c)− 1, we have that count(c′)6 k. Thus, by inductive hypothesis
and (12), we can conclude that c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c′, σ0),
and from (13), we have that c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0).
Case 2.2: c1 is a sequence of actions. Then, c2 is a case plan. Let us assume that c2 is
the case plan.
Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
Similar to case 2.1, we conclude that there exists j , 16 j 6 l, such that
MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕj , s′)∧ Apply(c1,S0, s′)∧ s′ 6=⊥ . (14)
Let c′ = c1;pj ; c3; . . . ; cn. From (14) and Lemma B.20, we have that
MR ∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0, s)≡ Apply(c′,S0, s). (15)
By inductive hypothesis, we have that c′ is executable in σ0 and ϕj is known to be true
in Φ̂(c1, σ0). Hence,
Φ̂(c, σ0)= Φ̂(c′, σ0). (16)
Since count(c′)6 count(c)−1, we have that count(c′)6 k. Thus, by inductive hypothesis,
we can conclude that ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c′, σ0). This, together with (16), proves
that c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0).
The two cases 2.1 and 2.2 prove that if MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧
s 6=⊥ then c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0).
The two cases 1 and 2 prove that c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in
Φ̂(c, σ0) iff
MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥ . (17)
The proof of the inductive step for the last item of the lemma, Φ̂(c, σ0) =⊥ iff
Apply(c,S0,⊥) is true in MR ∪ BApply has also four cases similar to the cases (1.1)–(1.2)
and (2.1)–(2.2). We will show next the first case. The other cases are similar and are omitted
here.
Assume that Φ̂(c, σ0)=⊥ where c= c1, . . . , cn and c1 is the following case plan
Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
We will show that Apply(c,S0,⊥) is true in MR ∪BApply. We consider two cases:
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(a) There exists no j such that ϕj is known to be true in σ0. By Lemma B.9, we have that
¬Knows(ϕj ,S0) is true in MR for 1 6 j 6 l. Applies the last definition of Apply l times,
we have that
Apply(c,S0,S′)⊃ Apply([case([])|c′],S0,S′) is true in BApply where c′ = c2, . . . , cn. By
the third item in the definition, we can then conclude that Apply(c,S0,S′)⊃ Apply(c,S0,
⊥) is true in MR ∪BApply, i.e., the inductive step is proved.
(b) There exists some j such that ϕj is known to be true in σ0. Again, by Lemma B.9, we
have that Knows(ϕj ,S0) is true inMR and Knows(ϕi,S0) is false inMR for 16 i 6= j 6 l.
Then, by Lemma B.19, we have that
MR ∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0, s)≡ Apply(c′,S0, s),
where c′ = pj ; c2; . . . ; cn. This, together with the fact that Φ̂(c, σ0)= Φ̂(c′, σ0)=⊥ and
the inductive hypothesis implies that Apply(c,S0,⊥) is true in MR ∪BApply.
The above two cases prove the inductive step for the second item of the lemma.
(18)
The lemma follows from (17) and (18). 2
Lemma B.22. Let D be a domain description and MR be a model of R(D). Then, there
exists a model M = (σ0,Φ) of D such that for any fluent formula ϕ and any conditional
plan c,
• MR ∪ BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s) ∧ Apply(c,S0, s)) ∧ s 6=⊥ iff c is executable in σ0 and
ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0);
• Φ̂(c, σ0)=⊥ iff MR ∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0,⊥).
Proof. From Observation 3.1, we can assume that c = c1; . . . ; cn where ci is a sequence
of actions or a case plan and for every i , 16 i 6 n− 1, if ci is a sequence of actions then
ci+1 is a case plan.
Let M = (σ0,Φ) be the MR-based model of D. By Lemma B.10, M is a model of D.
We will prove by induction over the number of case plan in c, count(c), that M satisfies
the lemma.
Base case: count(c)= 0. Using item (i) of the Lemma B.16, we can prove that
MR ∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0, s)⊃
(Poss(c,S0)⊃ s= do(c,S0))∧ (¬Poss(c,S0)⊃ s=⊥). (1)
By Lemma B.14, we have that
MR |= Knows(ϕ,do(c,S0)) ∧ Poss(c,S0) iff c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be
true in Φ̂(c, σ0). This, together with (1), proves that
MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥
iff c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0). (2)
Furthermore, since c is a sequence of actions, from (1), MR ∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0,⊥)
iff ¬Poss(c,S0) is true in MR . Again, by Lemma B.14, this is equivalent to c is not
executable in σ0.
The base case for the third item of the lemma is proved. (3)
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The base case of the lemma follows from (2)–(3).
Inductive step: Assume that we have proved the lemma for count(c) 6 k. We need to
prove the lemma for count(c)= k + 1.
Case 1: c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0). We will show that
MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥. We consider two cases:
Case 1.1: c1 is a case plan. Assume that c1 is the following case plan
Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
Since c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0)we have that⊥ 6= Φ̂(c, σ0).
This implies that
there exists j, 16 j 6 l, such that ϕj is known to be true in σ0. (4)
Let c′ = pj ; c2; . . . ; cn. Then, by definition of Φ̂ and from (4) we have that Φ̂(c, σ0) =
Φ̂(c′, σ0). This implies that
ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c′, σ0). (5)
From (4) and Lemma B.19, we have that
MR ∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0, s)≡ Apply(c′,S0, s). (6)
Since count(c′)6 count(c)− 1, we have that count(c′)6 k. Thus, by inductive hypothesis
and (5), we can conclude thatMR ∪BApply |=Knows(ϕ, s)∧Apply(c′,S0, s)∧s 6=⊥. This,
together with (6), proves that MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥.
Case 1.2: c1 is a sequence of actions. Then, c2 is a case plan. Again, let us assume that
c2 is the case plan.
Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
Since c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0) we have that
⊥ 6= Φ̂(c, σ0). It implies that
there exists j, 16 j 6 l, such that ϕj is known to be true in Φ̂(c1, σ0). (7)
Let c′ = c1;pj ; c3; . . . ; cn. From (7), we have that
Φ̂(c, σ0)= Φ̂(c′, σ0). (8)
It follows from (8) and Lemma B.20 that
MR ∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0, s)≡ Apply(c′,S0, s). (9)
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Since count(c′)6 count(c)− 1, we have that count(c′)6 k. Thus, by inductive hypothesis
and (8), we can conclude thatMR ∪BApply |=Knows(ϕ, s)∧Apply(c′,S0, s)∧s 6=⊥. This,
together with (9), proves that MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥.
From the two cases 1.1 and 1.2, we can conclude that if c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is
known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0) then MR ∪BApply |=Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥.
Case 2: MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥. We will prove that c is
executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0). We consider two cases:
Case 2.1: c1 is a case plan. Assume that c1 is the following case plan
Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
Since MR ∪ BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s) ∧ Apply(c,S0, s) ∧ s 6=⊥, using of Lemma (B.16),
we can conclude that
there exists j, 16 j 6 l, such that MR |= Knows(ϕj ,S0). (10)
Let c′ = pj ; c2; . . . ; cn. Then, by Lemma B.19 and (10), we conclude that MR ∪ BApply
|= Apply(c,S0, s) ≡ Apply(c′,S0, s). Together with the assumption that MR ∪ BApply |=
Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥, we have that
MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c′,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥ . (11)
Furthermore, from the definition of M and (10), we have that ϕj is known to be true in σ0.
This implies that
Φ̂(c, σ0)= Φ̂(c′, σ0). (12)
Since count(c′)6 count(c)− 1, we have that count(c′)6 k. Thus, by inductive hypothesis
and (11), we can conclude that c′ is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c′, σ0),
and from (12), we can conclude that c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in
Φ̂(c, σ0).
Case 2.2: c1 is a sequence of actions. Then, c2 is a case plan. Again, let us assume that
c2 is the case plan.
Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
Similar to case 2.1, we conclude that there exists j , 16 j 6 l, such that
MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕj , s′)∧ Apply(c1,S0, s′). (13)
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Let c′ = c1;pj ; c3; . . . ; cn. From (13) and Lemmas B.20, we have that MR ∪ BApply |=
Apply(c,S0, s)≡ Apply(c′,S0, s). Hence
MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c′,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥ . (14)
Since c1 is a sequence of actions, we have that ϕj is known to be true in Φ̂(c1, σ0). Hence,
Φ̂(c, σ0)= Φ̂(c′, σ0). (15)
Since count(c′) 6 count(c) − 1, we have that count(c′) 6 k. Thus, by inductive
hypothesis and (14), we conclude that c′ is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true
in Φ̂(c′, σ0). This, together with (15), proves that c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to
be true in Φ̂(c, σ0).
From the two cases 2.1 and 2.2, we conclude that if MR ∪ BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s) ∧
Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥ then c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0).
The two cases 1 and 2 show that c is executable in σ0 and ϕ is known to be true in
Φ̂(c, σ0) iff
MR ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥ . (16)
The proof of the third item of the lemma, i.e., Φ̂(c, σ0) =⊥ iff MR ∪ BApply |=
Apply(c,S0,⊥) is similar to the proof of the second item of Lemma B.21 and is omitted
here. This, together with (16), proves the inductive step of the lemma, and hence, proves
the lemma. 2
Proposition 3. Let D be a domain description and R(D) be the corresponding first-order
theory. Let c be a conditional plan and ϕ be a fluent formula. Then,
D |=AK Knows ϕ after c iff
R(D) ∪BApply |= Apply(c,S0, s)∧Knows(ϕ, s)∧ s 6=⊥ .
Proof.
• Assume that D |=AK Knows ϕ after c. We will prove that R(D) ∪ BApply |=
Knows(ϕ, s)∧Apply(c,S0, s)∧s 6=⊥. Assume the contrary,R(D)∪BApply 6|= Knows(ϕ, s)
∧ Apply(c,S0, s) ∧ s 6=⊥. By definition, there exists a model MR of R(D) such that
MR ∪BApply 6|= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥. There are two possibilities
– MR ∪ BApply |= Apply(c,S0,⊥). Hence, by Lemma B.22, there exists a model M =
(σ0,Φ) of D such that Φ̂(c, σ0) =⊥. This implies that D 6|=AK Knows ϕ after c.
Hence, this case cannot happen. (1)
– MR ∪ BApply |= Apply(c,S0, s) ∧ s 6=⊥ and MR ∪ BApply 6|= Knows(ϕ, s). Then, by
Lemma B.22, there exists a model M of D such that M 6|= Knows ϕ after c. This
implies that D 6|=AK Knows ϕ after c. This contradicts with the assumption that
D |=AK Knows ϕ after c. Hence, this case cannot happen too. (2)
From (1) and (2), we conclude that our assumption is incorrect, i.e., we have proved that
R(D) ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥. Therefore, we have that
if D |=AK Knows ϕ after c then
R(D) ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥ . (3)
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• Assume that R(D) ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥. We will prove
thatD |=AK Knows ϕ after c. Assume the contrary,D 6|=AK Knows ϕ after c. This means
that there exists a model M = (σ0,Φ) of D such that M 6|= Knows ϕ after c. There are
two subcases:
– Φ̂(c, σ0) =⊥. Then, by Lemma B.21, there exists a model MR of R(D) such that
MR ∪ BApply |= Apply(c,S0, ⊥). This implies that MR ∪ BApply 6|= Knows(ϕ, s) ∧
Apply(c,S0, s) ∧ s 6=⊥, which contradicts with our assumption. Therefore, this case
cannot happen. (4)
– Φ̂(c, σ0) 6=⊥. Then, F is not known to be true in Φ̂(c, σ0). Then, by Lemma B.21,
there exists a model MR of R(D) such that MR ∪ BApply 6|= Knows(ϕ, s) ∧
Apply(c,S0, s) ∧ s 6=⊥. This implies that R(D) ∪ BApply 6|= Knows(ϕ, s) ∧ Apply(c,
S0, s)∧s 6=⊥, which contradicts our assumption. Hence, this case cannot happen too.
(5)
From (4) and (5), we have that D |=AK Knows ϕ after c. Hence, we have that
if R(D) |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥
then D |=AK Knows ϕ after c. (6)
From (3) and (6), we can conclude that
D |=AK Knows ϕ after c iff
R(D) ∪BApply |= Knows(ϕ, s)∧ Apply(c,S0, s)∧ s 6=⊥ . 2
Appendix C. Soundness of ω-Approximation
In this section we prove the soundness of the ω-Approximation with respect to the
semantics of AK . Throughout the section, by D we denote an arbitrary but fixed domain
description. We will need the following notations and lemmas.
Let σ = 〈T ,F 〉 be an a-state and δ = 〈u,Σ〉 be a c-state. We say σ agrees with δ if for
every state s ∈Σ , T ⊆ s and F ∩ s = ∅.
For an a-state σ = 〈T ,F 〉, by true(σ ) and false(σ ) we denote the set T and F
respectively.
For a sequence of actions α = a1, . . . , an (n > 1) and a state s, by Res(α, s)
we denote the state Res(an, . . . ,Res(a1, s)). Similarly Res0(α,σ ) denotes the state
Res0(an, . . . ,Res0(a1, σ )) where σ is an a-state and α = a1, . . . , an.
The following observations are trivial and will be used in the proofs in this section.
Observation C.1. Let σ = 〈T ,F 〉 be an a-state and δ = 〈u,Σ〉 be a grounded c-state such
that σ agrees with δ, then
(1) if ϕ is a fluent formula and ϕ holds in σ (σ |= ϕ), then for every s ∈Σ , ϕ holds in
s;
(2) for every action a, Φ(a, δ) is a grounded c-state;
(3) Σ ⊆ {true(σ ′) | σ ′ ∈ Comp(σ )};
(4) if α is a sequence of non-sensing actions and σ is complete, true(Res0(α,σ )) =
Res(α, true(σ ));
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(5) If a sequence of non-sensing actions, α, is ω-executable in σ then α is executable
in δ.
The proof of Proposition 6 is based on the following lemmas.
Lemma C.1. Let D be a domain description, σ be an a-state, and δ be a grounded c-state
of D such that σ agrees with δ. Then, for every sequence of non-sensing actions α of D,
Resω(α,σ ) agrees with Φ̂(α, δ).
Proof. Assume that σ = 〈T ,F 〉, δ = 〈s,Σ〉, and Φ̂(α, δ)= 〈sˆ, Σ̂〉. Let
f ∈ true(Resω(α,σ )).
⇒ f ∈
⋂
σ ′∈Comp(σ )
true(Res0(α,σ ′)). (by definition of Resω)
⇒∀σ ′ ∈ Comp(σ ) f ∈ true(Res0(α,σ ′)).
⇒∀σ ′ ∈ Comp(σ ) f ∈ Res(α, true(σ ′)). ( by item (4), Observation C.1)
⇒∀s′ ∈Σ f ∈ Res(α, s′). (by item (3), Observation C.1)
⇒∀s∗ ∈ Σ̂ f ∈ s∗. (1)
Let
f ∈ false(Resω(α,σ )).
⇒ f ∈
⋂
σ ′∈Comp(σ )
false(Res0(α,σ ′)). (by definition of Resω)
⇒∀σ ′ ∈ Comp(σ ) f ∈ false(Res0(α,σ ′)).
⇒∀σ ′ ∈ Comp(σ ) f /∈ Res(α, true(σ ′)). (by item (4), Observation C.1)
⇒∀s ∈Σ f /∈ Res(α, s). (by item (3), Observation C.1)
⇒∀s∗ ∈ Σ̂ f /∈ s∗. (2)
The lemma follows from (1) and (2). 2
Lemma C.2. Let D be a domain description, σ be an a-state, and δ be a grounded c-state
of D such that σ agrees with δ. Then, for every sensing action a of D that is ω-executable
in σ , there exists σ ′ ∈Φω(a,σ ) such that σ ′ agrees with Φ(a, δ).
Proof. Assume that a occurs in the k-propositions: a determines f1, . . ., a determines fn
By definition, we have that K(a,σ)= {f1, . . . , fn}.
Assume that σ = 〈T ,F 〉 and δ = 〈s,Σ〉. Let K1 = s ∩K(a,σ) and K2 =K(a,σ) \ s.
Since δ is a grounded c-state, we have that s ∈ Σ . From the assumption that σ agrees
with δ, we have that T ⊆ s and F ∩ s = ∅. This, together with the definitions ofK1 andK2,
implies thatK1∩F = ∅ andK2∩T = ∅. Therefore, we have that σ ′ = 〈T ∪K1,F ∪K2〉 ∈
Φω(a,σ ). We will prove that σ ′ agrees with Φ(a, δ).
Let Φ(a, δ)= 〈s,Σ ′〉 = δ′. Consider an arbitrary s′ ∈Σ ′. By definition of Φ(a, δ), we
have that s′ ∩ {f1, . . . , fn} = s ∩ {f1, . . . , fn} =K1 and {f1, . . . , fn} \ s′ = {f1, . . . , fn} \
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s = K2. Thus, K1 ⊆ s′ and s′ ∩K2 = ∅. Since σ agrees with δ we have that T ⊆ s′ and
F ∩ s′ = ∅. Therefore,
T ∪K1 ⊆ s′ and (F ∪K2)∩ s′ = ∅. (1)
Since (1) holds for every state s′ ∈ Σ ′, we have that 〈T ∪ K1,F ∪ K2〉 agrees with
〈s,Σ ′〉. This proves the lemma. 2
The next lemma is the generalization of the Lemmas C.1 and C.2 to a sequence actions
consisting of both sensing and non-sensing actions.
Lemma C.3. Let D be a domain description, σ be an a-state, and δ be a grounded c-state
of D such that σ agrees with δ. Then, for every sequence of actions α that is ω-executable
in σ ,
(i) α is executable in δ; and
(ii) there exists an a-state σ ′ ∈ Φ̂ω(α,σ ) such that σ ′ agrees with Φ̂(α, δ).
Proof. Let ns(α) be the number of sensing actions occurring in α. We prove the lemma by
induction over ns(α).
Base case: ns(α) = 0, i.e., α is a sequence of non-sensing actions. Item (5) of
Observation C.1 proves that α is executable in δ. Furthermore, by Lemma C.1, we have
that Resω(α,σ ) agrees with Φ̂(α, δ). Since α = pre(α), by definition of Φ̂ω , we have that
Φ̂ω(α,σ )=Φω(α,σ)= {Resω(α,σ )}. This proves the base case.
Inductive step: Assume that the first sensing action occurring in α is a, i.e., α = β;a;γ
where β does not contain a sensing action. Let Φ̂(β, δ)= δ1 and Resω(β,σ )= σ1. Then,
by Lemma C.1, σ1 agrees with δ1.
Since δ is a grounded c-state and β is a sequence of non-sensing actions, using item (2)
of Observation C.1, we can easily prove that δ1 is a grounded c-state. α is ω-executable in
σ implies that a;γ is ω-executable in σ1. Hence, by Lemma C.2, a is executable in δ1 and
∃σ2 ∈Φω(a,σ1) such that σ2 agrees with Φ(a, δ1)= δ2.
Again, from the assumption that α is ω-executable in σ we conclude that γ is ω-
executable in σ2. Since ns(γ )= ns(α)− 1, by the induction hypothesis, we conclude that
γ is executable in δ2 and ∃σ3 ∈ Φ̂ω(γ,σ2) such that σ3 agrees with Φ̂(γ, δ2)= δ3.
From Resω(β,σ ) = σ1, σ2 ∈ Φω(a,σ1), σ3 ∈ Φ̂ω(γ,σ2), and by definition of Φω , we
have that
σ3 ∈ Φ̂ω(α,σ ). (1)
From Φ̂(β, δ)= δ1, Φ(a, δ1)= δ2, Φ̂(γ, δ2)= δ3, and by definition of Φ̂ , we have that
Φ̂(α, δ)= δ3. (2)
Since σ3 agrees with δ3, from (1) and (2), we can conclude the induction step. Hence,
the lemma is proved. 2
In the next lemma we extend the result of Lemma C.3 to an arbitrary conditional plan.
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Lemma C.4. Let D be a domain description, σ be an a-state, and δ be a grounded c-state
ofD such that σ agrees with δ. Then, for every conditional plan c such that c is executable
in σ ,
(i) c is executable in δ; and
(ii) there exists an a-state σ ′ ∈ Φ̂ω(c, σ ) such that σ ′ agrees with Φ̂(c, δ).
Proof. By Observation 3.1, we know that c can be represented as a sequence of conditional
plans c1; . . . ; cn where ci is either a sequence of actions or a case plan and for every i < n
if ci is a sequence of actions then ci+1 is a case plan. We prove the lemma by induction
over count(c), the number of case plans in c.
The base case, count(c)= 0, is proved by Lemma C.3.
We now prove the inductive step, i.e., assume that the lemma is shown for count(c)6 k,
we prove the lemma for count(c)= k + 1. We consider two cases:
(a) c1 is a case plan. Assume that c1 is the following plan
Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
From the assumption that ⊥/∈ Φ̂ω(c, σ ) we can conclude that there exists j , 1 6 j 6 l,
such that ϕj holds in σ . Let c′ = pj ; c2 . . . ; cn. Then, by definition of Φ̂ω we have that
Φ̂ω(c, σ )= Φ̂ω(c′, σ ). (1)
Hence, ⊥/∈ Φ̂ω(c′, σ ). Since count(c) > count(c′) + 1, we have that count(c′) 6 k. By
inductive hypothesis, we have that
c′ is executable in δ and there exists a state σ ′ ∈ Φ̂ω(c′, σ ) such that
σ ′ agrees with Φ̂(c′, δ). (2)
Since σ agrees with δ and ϕj holds in σ , we can conclude that ϕj holds in δ, which implies
that c is executable in δ and
Φ̂(c, δ)= Φ̂(c′, δ). (3)
From (3), (2), and (1), we have that σ ′ ∈ Φ̂ω(c, σ ) and σ ′ agrees with Φ̂(c, δ). This proves
the lemma for the case (a).
(b) c1 is a sequence of actions. Let c′ = c2; . . . ; cn. Then, by definitions of Φ̂ and Φ̂ω ,
we have that Φ̂(c, δ)= Φ̂(c′, Φ̂(c1, δ)) and
Φ̂ω(c, σ )=
⋃
σ ′∈Φ̂ω(c1,σ )
Φ̂ω(c
′, σ ′). (4)
Since σ agrees with δ and δ is a grounded c-state, by Lemma C.3, we know that there
exists a state σ1 ∈ Φ̂ω(c1, σ ) such that σ1 agrees with Φ̂(c1, δ). Since c is ω-executable in
σ we have that c′ is ω-executable in σ1. Furthermore, since c′ starts with a case plan and
count(c′)= k + 1, from the first case, we can conclude that
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c1 is executable in δ and c′ is executable in Φ̂(c1, δ) and there exists a state
σ ′ ∈ Φ̂ω(c′, σ1) such that σ ′ agrees with Φ̂(c′, Φ̂(c1, δ)). (5)
From (4) and (5), we have that c is executable in δ, σ ′ ∈ Φ̂ω(c, σ ) and σ ′ agrees with
Φ̂(c′, Φ̂(c1, δ))= Φ̂(c, δ). Hence the inductive step is proved for case (b).
The inductive step follows from the above two cases. 2
We are now ready to prove the Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 (Soundness of ω-Approximation with respect to |=AK ). LetD be a domain
description, ϕ be a fluent formula, and c be a conditional plan. Then,
if D |=ω Knows ϕ after c then D |=AK Knows ϕ after c.
Proof. Let σ0 be the initial a-state of D and δ0 be a grounded initial c-state of D. By
definition of σ0 and δ0, we have that
σ0 agrees with δ0. (1)
From D |=ω Knows ϕ after c, by definition of |=ω, we have that
⊥ /∈ Φ̂ω(c, σ0), and (2)
for every σ ′ ∈ Φ̂ω(c, σ0), ϕ holds in σ ′. (3)
By Lemma C.4, (1)–(3), we have that
c is executable in δ0, and (4)
there exists a state σ ′ ∈ Φ̂ω(c, σ0), such that σ ′ agrees with Φ̂(c, δ0).
This, together with (4), implies that ϕ is known to be true in Φ̂(c, δ0). (5)
(4) and (5) hold for every model (δ0,Φ) ofD. This implies that D |=AK Knows ϕ after c.
The proposition is proved. 2
Appendix D. Proof of the regression proposition
In this section, we prove the regression proposition. For shorter notation, we write σ |= ϕ
(respectively σ 6|= ϕ ) to denote that ϕ holds in σ (respectively ϕ does not hold in σ ). We
first prove several lemmas that we will use in the proof.
Lemma D.1. Let f be a fluent literal, a be an action, and s be a state. Assume that a is
executable in s. Then, f holds in Res(a, s) iff Regression(f, a) holds in s.
Proof. Consider the case that a is a non-sensing action and f is a fluent. Assume that
a causesf if %1, . . . , a causesf if %n, and a causes ¬f if %′1, . . . , a causes ¬f if %′m are
the ef-propositions in D whose action is a. Then, we have that
Regression(f, a)=∨ni=1%i ∨ (f ∧∧mi=1¬%′i ) holds in s
iff there exists an ef-proposition a causes f if % in D such that % holds in s or
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f holds in s and there exists no ef-proposition a causes ¬f if %′ in D
such that %′ holds in s
iff f ∈E+a (s) or (f ∈ s and f /∈E−a (s))
iff f ∈ s ∪E+a (s) \E−a (s)
iff f holds in Res(a, s). (1)
Similarly, we can prove that (1) also holds when f is a negative fluent literal. (2)
Consider the case that a is a sensing action. Then, we have that Res(a, s)= s (recall that
we assume that the set of sensing actions and non-sensing actions are disjoint) and,
Regression(f, a)= f. Thus, the lemma is trivial for this case. (3)
The lemma follows from (1)–(3). 2
The next corollary follows immediately from Lemma D.1 and the fact that
Regression
(
n∧
i
fi , a
)
=
n∧
i
Regression(fi , a).
Corollary D.1. For a conjunction of fluent literals ϕ, an action a, a state s such that a is
executable in s, ϕ holds in Res(a, s) iff Regression(ϕ, a) holds in s.
Lemma D.2. Let ϕ be a fluent formula, a be an action, and s be a state such that a is
executable in s. Then, ϕ holds in Res(a, s) iff Regression(ϕ, a) holds in s.
Proof. Since every Boolean expression can be represented by a CNF formula, we assume
that ϕ =∨i ϕi where each ϕi is a conjunction of fluent literals. Thus the lemma follows
directly from Corollary D.1 and the fact that
Regression
(
n∨
i
ϕi, a
)
=
n∨
i
Regression(ϕi, a). 2
Lemma D.3. Let ϕ be a fluent formula, a be an action, and σ = 〈s,Σ〉 be a grounded
c-state. Assume that a is executable in every state belonging to Σ . 11 Then,
• if Regression(Knows(ϕ), a) holds in σ then Knows(ϕ) holds in Φ(a,σ ); and
• if Regression(Knows(ϕ), a) does not hold in σ then Knows(ϕ) does not hold in
Φ(a,σ ).
Proof. Consider the case a is a non-sensing action. Then, we have that Regression
(Knows(ϕ), a)=Knows(Regression(ϕ, a)).
• Regression(Knows(ϕ), a) holds in σ implies that Regression(ϕ, a) holds in every
state s′ ∈Σ . This implies that ϕ holds in Res(a, s′) for every state s′ ∈Σ such that a
is executable in s′ (Lemma D.1). Therefore, Knows(ϕ) holds in Φ(a,Σ).
11 This implies that a is executable in s since σ is a grounded c-state.
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• Regression(Knows(ϕ), a) does not hold in σ means that there exists s′ ∈Σ such that
Regression(ϕ, a) does not hold in s′. Since a is executable in s′, by Lemma D.1, we
conclude that ϕ does not hold in Res(a, s′). This implies that Knows(ϕ) does not hold
in Φ(a,σ ).
Consider the case a is a sensing action that senses a fluent g, 12 we have that
Regression(ϕ, a)= ϕ and Φ(a,σ )= 〈s,Σ ′〉 where Σ ′ ⊆Σ and each state s′ in Σ ′ agrees
with s on g.
• Regression(Knows(ϕ), a) = (g→Knows(g→ϕ)) ∧ (¬g→Knows(¬g→ϕ)) holds
in σ implies that g ∈ s (respectively g /∈ s) implies that Knows(g→ϕ) (respectively
Knows(¬g→ϕ)) holds in σ . So, if g ∈ s (respectively g /∈ s) then g ∈ s′ (respectively
g /∈ s′) implies that ϕ holds in s′ for every s′ ∈Σ . In other words, for every s′ ∈Σ , if
s and s′ agree on g then ϕ holds in s′. Hence, ϕ is known to be true in Φ(a,σ ), i.e.,
Knows(ϕ) holds in Φ(a,σ ).
• Regression(Knows(ϕ), a) = (g→Knows(g→ϕ)) ∧ (¬g→Knows(¬g→ϕ)) does
not hold in σ implies that either (i) (g→Knows(g→ϕ)) does not hold in σ or (ii)
(¬g→Knows(¬g→ϕ)) does not hold in σ . Let us assume that g→Knows(g→ϕ)
does not hold in σ , i.e., (i) holds. This means that g holds in σ but Knows (g→ϕ)
does not. So, there exists a state s′ in Σ such that g ∈ s′ and ϕ does not hold in s′
or for every s′ in Σ , g /∈ s′. The first case implies that Knows (ϕ) does not hold in
Φ(a,σ ). The second case is impossible because σ is a grounded c-state. Thus if (i)
holds then Knows (ϕ) does not hold in Φ(a,σ ). Similarly, if (ii) holds, we can show
that Knows(ϕ) does not hold in Φ(a,σ ).
The lemma follows from the above two cases. 2
Lemma D.4. For a c-formula ϕ∗, an action a, and a grounded c-state σ = 〈s,Σ〉 such
that a is executable in every state belonging to Σ ,
• if σ |= Regression(ϕ∗, a) then Φ(a,σ ) |= ϕ∗; and
• if σ 6|= Regression(ϕ∗, a) then Φ(a,σ ) 6|= ϕ∗.
Proof. Follows from Lemmas D.2 and D.3 and the fact that each c-formula ϕ∗ can be
represented by a disjunction ∨ni=1 ϕ∗i where ϕ∗i is a conjunction of fluent literals and k-
formulas of the form Knows(%) for some fluent formula %. 2
Lemma D.5. Let ϕ be a c-formula and c be a conditional plan. Then, Regression(ϕ, c) is
a c-formula.
Proof. The proof is done inductively over count(c), the number of case plans in c. The
base case, c is a sequence of actions, follows immediately from items (1)–(4) and the first
two sub-items of item (5) of the definition of the regression formulas. The inductive step
follows from inductive hypothesis and the last two sub-items of item (5) of the definition
of the regression formulas. 2
12 The proof for the case when a senses more than one fluent g1, . . . , gn is similar and is omitted here.
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Lemma D.6. For a c-formula ϕ, an action sequence α, and a grounded c-state σ such that
α is executable in every grounded c-state σ ′ = 〈s′,Σ ′〉 where Σ ′ ⊆Σ ,
• if σ |= Regression(ϕ,α) then Φ̂(α,σ ) |= ϕ; and
• if σ 6|= Regression(ϕ,α) then Φ̂(α,σ ) 6|= ϕ.
Proof. Induction over |α|, the length of α.
Base case: |α| = 0, i.e., α = []. Then, we have that Regression(ϕ, [])= ϕ and Φ̂([], σ )=
σ . The lemma is trivial. (Notice that for |α| = 1, the lemma follows from Lemma D.4.) The
base case is proved.
Inductive step: Assume that we have proved the lemma for |α| = n. We need to prove
the lemma for |α| = n+ 1. Let α = β;a. Then, we have that |β| = n.
We have that Regression(ϕ,β;a) = Regression(ϕ,β;a) = (Regression(ϕ, a),β). By
inductive hypothesis we have that:
• If σ |= Regression(ϕ,α) then Φ̂(β,σ ) |= Regression(ϕ, a). Thus, by Lemma D.4,
Φ(a, Φ̂(β,σ )) |= ϕ, i.e., Φ̂(α,σ ) |= ϕ.
• If σ 6|= Regression(ϕ,α) then Φ̂(β,σ ) 6|= Regression(ϕ, a). Again, by Lemma D.4,
we have that Φ(a, Φ̂(β,σ )) 6|= ϕ, i.e., Φ̂(α,σ ) 6|= ϕ.
Lemma D.7. For a c-formula ϕ, a grounded c-state σ = 〈s,Σ〉, and a conditional plan c
such that c is executable in every c-state σ ′ = 〈s′,Σ ′〉 where Σ ′ ⊆Σ ,
• if σ |= Regression(ϕ, c) then Φ̂(c, σ ) |= ϕ; and
• if σ 6|= Regression(ϕ, c) then Φ̂(c, σ ) 6|= ϕ.
Proof. As in previous proofs related to conditional plans, we assume that c is a sequence
of conditional plans c1; . . . ; cn where ci is either a sequence of actions or a case plan and
for every i < n if ci is a sequence of actions then ci+1 is a case plan. We prove the lemma
by induction over count(c), the number of case plans in c.
Base case: count(c)= 0. Then, c is a sequence of actions. The base case follows from
Lemma D.6.
Inductive step: Assume that we have proved the lemma for count(c) 6 k. We need to
prove the lemma for count(c)= k + 1. By construction of c, we have two cases:
Case 1: cn is a case plan of the form
Case
ϕ1→ p1
...
ϕl→ pl
Endcase
Let c′ = c1; . . . ; cn−1. We have that
Regression(ϕ, c′; cn)= Regression(Regression(ϕ, cn), c′).
Since count(c) = count(c′) + count(cn) and count(cn) > 1, we have that count(c′) 6 k.
Furthermore, by Lemma D.5, we have that Regression(ϕ, cn) is a c-formula. Consider two
cases:
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Case 1.1: σ |= Regression(ϕ, c). By inductive hypothesis (for Regression(ϕ, cn), σ , and
c′), we have that Φ̂(c′, σ ) |= Regression(ϕ, cn).
Let δ = Φ̂(c′, σ ). Since c is executable in σ we conclude that there exists some j
(1 6 j 6 l) such that δ |= Knows (ϕj ) and δ 6|= Knows (ϕi) for i 6= j . This, together
with the fact that Regression(ϕ, cn) = ∨li=1(Knows (ϕi) ∧ Regression(ϕ,pi)), implies
that δ |= Knows (ϕj ) ∧ Regression(ϕ,pj ). Hence, δ |= Regression(ϕ,pj ). Applying the
inductive hypothesis one more time (for ϕ, δ, and pj ), we can conclude that Φ̂(pj , δ) |= ϕ.
Since Φ̂(cn, Φ̂(c′, σ ))= Φ̂(pj , δ), we have that
Φ̂(cn, Φ̂(c
′, σ )) |= ϕ, i.e., Φ̂(c, σ ) |= ϕ. (1)
Case 1.2: σ 6|= Regression(ϕ, c). Again, by inductive hypothesis (for Regression(ϕ, cn),
σ , and c′), we have that Φ̂(c′, σ ) 6|= Regression(ϕ, cn).
Let δ = Φ̂(c′, σ ). Since c is executable in σ we conclude that there exists some j
(1 6 j 6 l) such that δ |= Knows (ϕj ) and δ 6|= Knows (ϕi) for i 6= j . This, together
with the fact that Regression(ϕ, cn) = ∨li=1(Knows (ϕi) ∧ Regression(ϕ,pi)), implies
that δ 6|= Knows (ϕj ) ∧ Regression(ϕ,pj ). Hence, δ 6|= Regression(ϕ,pj ). Applying the
inductive hypothesis one more time (for ϕ, δ, and pj ), we have that Φ̂(pj , δ) 6|= ϕ. Since
Φ̂(cn, Φ̂(c
′, σ ))= Φ̂(pj , δ), we have that
Φ̂(cn, Φ̂(c
′, σ )) 6|= ϕ, i.e., Φ̂(c, σ ) 6|= ϕ. (2)
The inductive step for case 1 follows from (1) and (2).
Case 2: cn is a sequence of actions. Let c′ = c1; . . . ; cn−1. We have that
Regression(ϕ, c′; cn)= Regression(Regression(ϕ, cn), c′).
It follows from Observation 3.1 that cn−1 is a case plan. By case 1 and the inductive
hypothesis, (for Regression(ϕ, cn), σ , and c′), we have that:
• If σ |= Regression(ϕ, c) then Φ̂(c′, σ ) |= Regression(ϕ, cn). Then, by Lemma D.6
(for ϕ, Φ̂(c′, σ ), and cn), we can conclude that Φ̂(cn, Φ̂(c′, σ )) |= ϕ, i.e., Φ̂(c, σ ) |=
ϕ.
• If σ 6|= Regression(ϕ, c) then Φ̂(c′, σ ) 6|= Regression(ϕ, cn). Again, by Lemma D.6,
we have that Φ̂(cn, Φ̂(c′, σ )) 6|= ϕ, i.e., Φ̂(c, σ ) 6|= ϕ.
This proves the inductive step and hence, the lemma is proved. 2
We now prove Proposition 8.
Proposition 8. Given a domain descriptionD, let ϕ be a c-formula, and σ1, . . . , σn be the
set of grounded initial c-states of D, and c be a conditional plan that is executable in all
the grounded initial c-states of D. Then,
∀i,16 i 6 n, σi |= Regression(ϕ, c) iff ∀j,16 j 6 n, Φ̂(c, σj ) |= ϕ.
Proof. Let σi = 〈s,Σ〉 be a grounded initial c-state of D. It is easy to see that each
grounded c-state 〈s′,Σ ′〉 where Σ ′ ⊆ Σ is also a grounded initial c-state of D. Thus,
by the first item of Lemma D.7, we have that
if σi |= Regression(ϕ, c) then Φ̂(c, σj ) |= ϕ. (1)
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Using the second item of Lemma D.7, we can prove that
if Φ̂(c, σj ) |= ϕ then σi |= Regression(ϕ, c). (2)
The conclusion of the lemma follows from the fact that (1) and (2) hold for every i ,
16 i 6 n. 2
Appendix E. Overview of nested circumscription
Nested Abnormality Theories (NATs) is a novel circumscription [32,39] technique
introduced by Lifschitz [33]. With NATs it is possible to circumscribe several predicates
each with respect to only parts of the theory of interest, as opposed to previous techniques
such as parallelized and circumscription theories where the circumscription must be
done with respect to all of the axioms in the underlying theory. Furthermore, all the
complications arising from the interaction of multiple circumscription axioms in a theory
are avoided in NATs with the introduction of blocks. A block is characterized by a set of
axiomsA1, . . . ,An—possibly containing the abnormality predicateAb—which ‘describe’
a set of predicate/function constants C1, . . . ,Cm. The notation for such a theory is
{C1, . . . ,Cm :A1, . . . ,An}, (E.1)
where each Ai may itself be a block of form (E.1). The ‘description’ of C1, . . . ,Cm by a
block may depend on other descriptions in embedded blocks.
Interference between circumscription in different blocks is prevented by replacing a
predicateAb with an existentially quantified variable. Lifschitz’s idea is to makeAb ‘local’
to the block where it is used, since abnormality predicates play only an auxiliary role, i.e.
the interesting consequences of the theory are those which do not contain Ab. The next
section contains the formal definitions of this concepts.
The following definitions are from [33]. Let L be a second-order language which does
not include Ab. For every natural number k, let Lk be the language obtained by adding the
k-ary predicate constant Ab to L. {C1, . . . ,Cm :A1, . . . ,An} is a block if each C1, . . . ,Cm
is a predicate or a function constant of L, and each A1, . . . ,An is a formula of Lk or a
block.
A Nested Abnormality Theory is a set of blocks. The semantics of NATs is characterized
by a mapping ϕ from blocks into sentences of L. If A is a formula of language Lk , ϕA
stands for the universal closure of A, otherwise
ϕ{C1, . . . ,Cm :A1, . . . ,An} = (∃ab)F (ab),
where
F(Ab)= CIRC[ϕA1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕAn;Ab;C1, . . . ,Cm].
Recall that CIRC[T ;P ;Q], means circumscription of the theory T , by minimizing the
predicates in P , and varying the objects in Q.
For any NAT T , ϕT stands for {ϕA | A ∈ T }. A model of T is a model of ϕT in the
sense of classical logic. A consequence of T is a sentence φ of language L that is true in
all models of T . In this paper, as suggested in [33], we use the abbreviation
{C1, . . . ,Cm,minP :A1, . . . ,An}
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to denote blocks of the form
{C1, . . . ,Cm,P :P(x)⊃Ab(x),A1, . . . ,An}.
As the notation suggests, this type of block is used when it is necessary to circumscribe a
particular predicate P in a block. In [33] it is shown that
ϕ{C1, . . . ,Cm,minP :A1, . . . ,An}
is equivalent to the formula
CIRC[A1 ∧ · · · ∧An;P ;C1, . . . ,Cm],
when each Ai is a sentence.
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